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ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: RETHINKING 
FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS FOR 
SEIZURES AND USES OF FORCE IN 
SCHOOLS 
Alexis Karteron* 
Fourth Amendment standards regarding seizures and uses of force against 
juveniles in schools require a critical reassessment. Although jurists and scholars 
have paid it scant attention, this branch of Fourth Amendment doctrine offers a 
valuable lens for understanding the school-to-prison pipeline and the power of 
law enforcement officers to detain, handcuff, and use force against schoolchil-
dren. While the Supreme Court has announced principles regarding the Fourth 
Amendment in schools generally, it has never addressed this issue directly. 
This Article explores empirical findings on the role of law enforcement in 
schools and the unique characteristics of juveniles that should impact Fourth 
Amendment “reasonableness” analyses. Police practices in schools often nega-
tively affect not only the students subjected to them, but the entire school climate. 
Additionally, youth are more likely than adults to be harmed by law enforcement 
tactics. A review of lower court jurisprudence in this area reveals incoherence. 
Courts have taken a variety of approaches, often relying on faulty assumptions 
about law enforcement practices in schools. They frequently import bright-line 
rules from street-policing cases, which are inappropriate in the school context. 
This Article proposes a recalibration of the “reasonableness” standard to 
reflect the Supreme Court’s admonitions that the school environment and age of 
the student matter. It suggests mandated consideration of objective factors that 
reflect the specific interests of youth in schools. This approach is workable and 
provides the flexibility needed to ensure substantive judicial review of troubling 
practices that deserve attention. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the policing of youth in schools has attracted substantial 
public attention. In one story that made headlines, a shocking video depicted a 
police officer slamming a student to the floor in a South Carolina high school 
classroom.1 What offense elicited such a violent response? The student, a fif-
teen-year-old girl, refused to turn over a cell phone to a teacher.2 The New York 
Times described the incident as follows: as the girl sat quietly, the officer was 
seen “grabbing [her]” by the neck, “flipping her backward” as she sat at her 
desk, then “dragging and throwing her across the floor.”3 She was removed 
from the classroom, handcuffed, taken to a local police station, and charged 
under South Carolina’s “disturbing schools” statute. A classmate who protested 
                                                        
1  Christine Hauser, Video of Student Arrest in South Carolina Puts Focus on School Offic-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/us/video-of-student-
arrest-n-south-carolina-puts-focus-on-school-officers.html [https://perma.cc/T3ZJ-CU7C]. 
2  Richard Pérez-Peña et al., Rough Student Arrest Puts Spotlight on Police, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/police-officers-in-schools.html 
[https://perma.cc/9QX3-R6TP]. 
3  Hauser, supra note 1. 
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her rough treatment was arrested as well.4 Similarly, in New York City, a 
twelve-year-old girl was charged with “making graffiti” after writing “Lex was 
here” on a desk, a fourteen-year-old was arrested for refusing to stop texting, 
and an eleven-year-old was charged with theft for taking a lollipop.5 Aside 
from arrests involving handcuffing, law enforcement officers (often referred to 
as “school resource officers” or “SROs”) have subjected students across the 
country to punches, kicks, other unwanted touchings, along with shocks and 
assaults with Tasers and mace.6 
The “school-to-prison pipeline” is the term commonly used to describe this 
pattern of aggressive arrests and uses of force by SROs, as well as the exces-
sive use of exclusionary disciplinary measures like suspensions. This metaphor-
ical term encompasses a range of policies and practices often leading young 
people to become ensnared in the criminal justice system. Sometimes the con-
nection to the criminal justice system is instant—such as when a student who is 
arrested in school is then prosecuted. But sometimes the connection is more at-
tenuated—such as when a student is subject to repeated or lengthy suspensions 
from school, ultimately drops out, and then turns to criminal activity. Along 
with students and parents, civil rights and juvenile justice advocates across the 
United States have confronted school districts, police departments, and actors 
in the criminal justice system to insist that they recognize the significant harm 
that the school-to-prison pipeline and its typical “zero tolerance” policies have 
on youth.7 In the 2013–2014 school year, data collected by the U.S. Department 
                                                        
4  Represented by the ACLU, that classmate has filed a federal lawsuit challenging the stat-
ute under which she was arrested on vagueness grounds. See Complaint, Kenny v. Wilson, 
No. 2:16-CV-2794-CWH (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2016). 
5  See Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero 
Tolerance Discipline in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1374 
& nn.1–3, 1376–77 & n.13 (2011). 
6  The ACLU recently published an excellent compilation of news accounts of arrests and 
uses of force against students in school. See ACLU, BULLIES IN BLUE 23 (2017), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_bullies_in_blue_4_11_17_final.
pdf [https://perma.cc/84DE-2474]. 
7  See Kavitha Mediratta, Grassroots Organizing and the School-to-Prison Pipeline: The 
Emerging National Movement to Roll Back Zero Tolerance Discipline Policies in U.S. Pub-
lic Schools, in DISRUPTING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 211–36 (Sofía Bahena et al. 
eds., 2012) (describing grassroots organizing and research and policy efforts to address the 
school-to-prison pipeline); see also, e.g., ACLU & NYCLU, CRIMINALIZING THE 
CLASSROOM: THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS 28 (2007), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/overpolicingschools_20070318.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MY7Z-XLFA]; ACLU OF WASHINGTON, STUDENTS NOT SUSPECTS: THE 
NEED TO REFORM SCHOOL POLICING IN WASHINGTON STATE 12 (2017), https://www.aclu-
wa.org/docs/students-not-suspects-need-reform-school-policing-washington-state 
[https://perma.cc/V25H-Y2FU]; ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 7 (2005), https://b.3cdn.net/advancement/5351180e24cb 
166d02_mlbrqgxlh.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX4N-9KQK]; ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF 
ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (2000), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resear 
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of Education revealed nearly 70,000 arrests and 223,000 referrals to law en-
forcement by schools.8 
The public outcry about law enforcement practices in schools has been 
loud in some arenas, but has largely occurred in policymaking circles such as 
school boards, departments of education, and legislative bodies. The courts 
have played a quieter, but significant role. Specifically, they have explained—
in a fairly disjointed body of law—how the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
on unreasonable searches and seizures applies in schools. 
The Fourth Amendment protects all persons from “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” and offers an important legal framework for understanding law 
enforcement practices in schools that result in arrests, handcuffing, and uses of 
force.9 The “ ‘basic purpose of t[he Fourth] Amendment . . . is to safeguard the 
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental 
officials.’ ”10 
The Supreme Court has opined that “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by 
means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is re-
strained.”11 Seizures take different forms, ranging from temporary stops or de-
tentions,12 to full-blown arrests, which usually involve handcuffs.13 Typically, a 
                                                                                                                                 
ch/k-12-education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-
of-zero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunities-suspended-zero-tolerance-
2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EBT-P6GC]; DIGNITY IN SCHOOLS CAMPAIGN, COUNSELORS NOT 
COPS: ENDING THE REGULAR PRESENCE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN SCHOOLS 1 (2016), 
http://dignityinsc.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/DSC_Counselors_Not_Cops_ 
Recommendations-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJR4-YW5K]; TEXAS APPLESEED & TEXANS 
CARE FOR CHILDREN, DANGEROUS DISCIPLINE: HOW TEXAS SCHOOLS ARE RELYING ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT, COURTS, AND JUVENILE PROBATION TO DISCIPLINE STUDENTS (2016), 
http://stories.texasappleseed.org/dangerous-discipline [https://perma.cc/6KLX-5THN]; 
KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW ET AL., BLACK GIRLS MATTER: PUSHED OUT, OVERPOLICED, 
AND UNDERPROTECTED 16 (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b8045 
1158d8c/t/54dcc1ece4b001c03e323448/1423753708557/AAPF_BlackGirlsMatterReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5P9B-WDBU]; ACLU, BULLIES IN BLUE, supra note 6 at 9. 
8  Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Black Students More Likely to Be Arrested at School, ED. 
WEEK (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/01/25/black-students-more-
likely-to-be-arrested.html [https://perma.cc/JYY9-JXNK]. 
9  The Fourth Amendment provides as follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
US CONST. amend. IV. 
10  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985). 
11   United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). This standard is an objective one, 
“looking to the reasonable man’s interpretation of the conduct in question[.]” Michigan v. 
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) (citation omitted). 
12  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (“It must be recognized that whenever a police of-
ficer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that per-
son.”). 
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police officer must have “reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity 
is afoot” to conduct a temporary stop or detention.14 In contrast, probable cause 
is required for an arrest.15 In general, an arrest is permissible whenever there is 
probable cause that some offense—no matter how minor—has been commit-
ted.16 
Exceptions to these standards are permitted under the “special needs” doc-
trine, which allows government agents to conduct temporary detentions without 
suspicion in certain circumstances. For example, road checkpoints in which all 
vehicles are required to stop are permissible when conducted for the purpose of 
verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations, or to identify drunk driv-
ers, but not for general crime control purposes.17 The Supreme Court has more 
commonly addressed whether “special needs” necessitate suspension of usual 
standards in the search context.18 As discussed further in Section II.A, the Su-
preme Court has never addressed how the Fourth Amendment standards for 
seizures of the person apply in schools, although it has invoked the special 
needs doctrine when deciding numerous cases involving searches in schools. 
The right to be free from the use of excessive force by government agents 
is also usually analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.19 As discussed in detail 
                                                                                                                                 
13  Terry stops sometimes involve handcuffing as well. See, e.g., United States v. Perdue, 8 
F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th 
Cir. 1989). 
14  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
15  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a 
public place for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.”). The Supreme 
Court has defined probable cause as “ ‘a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and that the 
belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Id. 
at 371 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 (1979)). 
16  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“[T]he standard of probable 
cause ‘applie[s] to all arrests, without the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances 
involved in particular situations. . . . [Officers acting with probable cause are] authorized . . . 
to make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not 
[the] arrest was in some sense necessary.”). But it is noteworthy that “individualized review” 
is appropriate when an arrest “is ‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful 
to [the citizen’s] privacy or even physical interests.’ ” Id. at 352–53 (quoting Whren v. Unit-
ed States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)). 
17  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000) (holding that checkpoint pro-
gram with purpose of seizing drugs violated the Fourth Amendment); Michigan Dep’t of 
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (holding that checkpoint program with pur-
pose of identifying drunk drivers passed Fourth Amendment scrutiny). 
18  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (consider-
ing whether Fourth Amendment permits suspicionless drug testing of certain US Customs 
employees); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (same for rail-
road employees). 
19  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (“Where . . . the excessive force claim arises 
in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly character-
ized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the 
right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.” 
(quoting US CONST. amend. IV)). 
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in Section II.B, the Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Connor demands 
consideration of the “facts and circumstances of each particular case” to deter-
mine whether a law enforcement officer’s use of force was objectively reason-
able.20 
While the standards concerning seizures identified above are essentially 
binary ones, e.g., probable cause exists or it does not, both the special needs 
and excessive force doctrines rely on balancing the interests of the individual 
subjected to the seizure or use of force against the government’s.21 It is within 
this context that this Article attempts to elucidate the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment’s “fundamental command” of reasonableness22 regarding seizures 
and uses of force in schools, and argues that the current doctrine does not ac-
count for the unique interests and harms at play in this unique context. 
Scholars have largely overlooked the standards for seizures and uses of 
force in schools. In general, seizures are the “neglected sibling” of the Fourth 
Amendment world.23 Criminal procedure scholarship rarely delves into the 
realm of schools, and when it does, it tends to focus on searches.24 Similarly, 
scholars writing about education and the school-to-prison pipeline rarely em-
phasize the criminal procedure issues in play, and instead often focus on poten-
tial policy prescriptions that could be used by school districts and the federal 
government to address the school-to-prison pipeline.25 This Article thus fills a 
                                                        
20  Id. at 396. 
21  See id. at 394. 
22  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). 
23  Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 DENV. L. REV. 53, 59 (2015). 
24  See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth 
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 847 (2011); Sa-
rah Jane Forman, Countering Criminalization: Toward a Youth Development Approach to 
School Searches, 14 SCHOLAR 301, 302 (2011); Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Stu-
dents: The Supreme Court’s Latest Failure to Articulate a “Sufficiently Clear” Statement of 
Fourth Amendment Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 955, 955 (2011) [hereinafter Gardner, Strip Searching 
Students]; Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal for an Indi-
vidualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the Schools, 22 GA. L. 
REV. 897, 897 (1988) [hereinafter Gardner, Student Privacy]; Michael Pinard, From the 
Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School 
Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003). 
25  See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 823, 825 (2015) (discussing due process standards that should apply to school 
expulsions and suspensions); Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 565, 566 (2016) (describing negative impact of criminal justice adjudication 
of school disciplinary issues and assessing one county’s “anti-pipeline collaborative”); Cath-
erine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864–65 (2012) (suggest-
ing that courts should consider social science evidence about the impact of school discipline 
practices when determining whether constitutional standards should be altered in the school 
context); Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 919, 959–60 (2016) [hereinafter Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison 
Pipeline] (offering empirical analysis of impact of police officer presence on law enforce-
ment referrals); Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 1 (2013) 
[hereinafter Nance, Students, Security, and Race] (providing empirical analysis of students’ 
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gap in both criminal procedure and education scholarship by directly answering 
the question of how reasonableness should be defined under the Fourth 
Amendment when addressing seizures and uses of force in schools. It is beyond 
this Article’s scope to address the many policy reforms that school districts and 
police departments can, and in some cases, have taken to ameliorate the harms 
of the school-to-prison pipeline.26 Instead, it focuses on the Fourth Amendment 
questions concerning seizures and uses of force, and the particular ways they 
unfold in schools. 
Because defining “reasonableness” requires understanding how the use of 
seizures and force impact the communities and youth they are levied against, 
Part I addresses the findings of social scientists regarding the negative impact 
that aggressive police practices can have on the school environment and stu-
dents. Part I also discusses the unique vulnerabilities of youth to aggressive po-
lice practices, particularly those who suffer from the lasting effects of traumatic 
experiences.  
Beginning with the seminal case of New Jersey v. T.L.O.,27 Part II of this 
Article traces the development of Fourth Amendment standards concerning sei-
zures of persons and uses of force by law enforcement officers in schools in the 
courts, primarily the federal circuit courts. Although courts have frequently in-
voked T.L.O.’s demand for “reasonableness,” the comprehensive review of 
federal and state appellate decisions in Section II.C reveals that courts have 
haphazardly applied that standard, and sometimes inappropriately supplement-
ed it with rules developed in cases involving adults (outside of schools), with-
out any regard for whether those standards are appropriate for youth in the 
school context. This review reveals a dismal jurisprudential record, remarkable 
for its incoherence. 
Part III proposes that courts rethink their approach to analyzing seizures 
and uses of force on youth in schools by recalibrating the reasonableness stand-
ard. It concludes that the lower courts have gleaned the wrong lessons from the 
Supreme Court’s decisions concerning searches in schools, missing the funda-
                                                                                                                                 
likelihood of encountering “intense security conditions in their schools” and arguing that 
such conditions fuel mistrust between students and educators). But see Jason P. Nance, 
School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 79, 79 (2014) [hereinaf-
ter Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment] (offering reformulated Fourth 
Amendment framework for evaluating students’ claims); Jason P. Nance, Random, Suspi-
cionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, and Normative Analysis, 84 
U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 367 (2013) (analyzing Fourth Amendment questions concerning sus-
picionless searches of students). 
26  For example, students in Phoenix have recently launched a campaign titled #CopsOut-
taCampus to protest the presence of police officers in public schools. See BrieAnna J. Frank, 
Students Launch #CopsOuttaCampus Campaign at Phoenix Union High School District 
Schools, REPUBLIC (May 5, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/2017/05/05/cops-
outta-campus-campaign-launches-phoenix-union-high-schools/311279001 [https://perma.cc/ 
AN9Q-DY6Q]. For excellent descriptions of policy efforts aimed at addressing the harms of 
the school to prison pipeline, see generally Mediratta, supra note 7. 
27  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325. 
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mental principles that the school context and unique vulnerabilities of juveniles 
are relevant to defining reasonableness, and disregarded evidence of those vul-
nerabilities.  
Relying in part on the empirical evidence regarding the harm of seizures 
and uses of force on school climate and youth, this Article offers an amended 
approach for analyzing these claims that courts can readily put to use when 
confronted with Fourth Amendment claims in this context. It concludes that 
reasonableness requires consideration of objective factors especially relevant to 
the school context and unique vulnerabilities of youth including: the serious-
ness of the alleged infraction or crime; the likelihood that the student has com-
mitted an infraction or crime; the age of the student; the size and stature of the 
student; the likelihood of inflicting harm or trauma, especially in light of 
known disabilities or vulnerabilities; and the necessity of the enforcement ac-
tion. This approach is faithful to Supreme Court precedent and provides suffi-
cient flexibility to account for evolving understandings of the interests of both 
schools and youth. 
I. SEIZURES AND THE USE OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS: THE EMPIRICAL 
BACKGROUND 
Fourth Amendment claims concerning seizures and uses of force in schools 
often address complex issues. Are school resources officers functioning as 
counselors or cops? Does arresting a student for engaging in disruptive behav-
ior improve the school climate for other students and facilitate learning? Do 
law enforcement tools and tactics, such as Tasers or mace, affect kids the same 
way they affect adults? Unfortunately, courts confronting these issues tend to 
resolve questions like these—often implicitly—without a complete understand-
ing of the impact those practices have on school environments or students. In-
stead, they engage in what has been termed “blind balancing”: “the process of 
decision making based simply on common sense and a gut assessment of risk, 
without consideration of data, evidence, or empirical studies.”28 This leaves 
courts unable to assess the interests the stake—both the student’s and the gov-
ernment’s—in Fourth Amendment cases concerning seizures and uses of force 
in schools.  
To avoid blind balancing, defining “reasonableness” under the Fourth 
Amendment requires an accurate understanding of the school environment and 
the youth who inhabit it. However, instead of gaining that understanding, courts 
often make erroneous assumptions. Two particular assumptions stand out. First, 
as several scholars have pointed out, courts commonly assume that a school 
disciplinary approach focused on order maintenance, which sometimes in-
volves a police presence, contributes positively to the school environment.29 
                                                        
28  Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (2013). 
29  See, e.g., Kim, supra note 25, at 868–74 (discussing foundational Supreme Court cases on 
school discipline and searches and noting that courts have relied on “common-sense intui-
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Courts often presume that police in schools assist in maintaining order, thereby 
fostering an environment that is conducive to learning. Second, courts often 
import rules from the street-policing context into cases addressing seizures or 
uses of force in schools. These importations rest on the assumption that seizures 
and uses of force are one-size-fits-all law enforcement tools and, therefore, are 
just as appropriate for youth in school as they are for adults. 
This Part addresses these assumptions by identifying empirical evidence 
that reveals the negative impact of aggressive police practices in schools. In 
particular, two areas are worthy of attention. First, the negative impact the use 
of law enforcement tactics like arrests can have on school climates, including 
the role of SROs in criminalizing normal adolescent behavior that traditionally 
has not been treated as criminal. Second, the unique characteristics of juveniles 
that make them more likely to engage in disruptive behavior and more vulnera-
ble to police practices like arrests and uses of force.  
A. Criminalization of Student Misbehavior 
Reports by advocates and social scientists show that criminalization of stu-
dent misbehavior, like subjecting students to arrest or other criminal justice en-
forcement mechanisms, is a common occurrence in many American schools. 
This occurs for a variety of reasons. At times, law enforcement officers respond 
to serious crimes in schools that virtually all agree would require a police re-
sponse, such as those involving violence. But sometimes law enforcement of-
ficers respond to minor misbehavior that should not subject a student to crimi-
nal treatment, such as food fights, hair pulling, drawing on desks, or using cell 
phones.30 Incidents that escalate to arrest, regardless of the seriousness of the 
offense, often involve handcuffing, being perp-walked out of school in front of 
peers, and hours (or even days) spent detained at police precincts and other 
holding facilities.31 This response may turn on the culture of the school in 
                                                                                                                                 
tions about what is good for the child, rather than engaging in a fact-based inquiry”); Nance, 
School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 25, at 130 (noting that the Su-
preme Court has lowered Fourth Amendment standards in schools “to preserve an orderly 
environment conducive to learning”); Pinard, supra note 24, at 1095–96 (noting that courts 
have justified applying lower Fourth Amendment standards based on assumptions about the 
role of law enforcement in schools). 
30  See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. See also Sara Gates, Students Arrested After 
Food Fight at Ola High School in Georgia, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/06/food-fight-ola-high-school-georgia-students-
arrested_n_2631829.html [https://perma.cc/E9N4-XSC9]; Susan Saulny, 25 Students Arrest-
ed for a Middle-School Food Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/11/11/us/11foodfight.html [https://perma.cc/WXX6-PKYR]. 
31  See KATHLEEN NOLAN, POLICE IN THE HALLWAYS: DISCIPLINE IN AN URBAN HIGH SCHOOL 
54–55 (2011) (describing common scenario in a Bronx high school of students being hand-
cuffed, brought to a dean’s office, and walked out of school for arrest processing). 
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which it takes place, which is determined in part by the attitude of the educators 
involved and the role of law enforcement officers in the school.32  
The widespread presence of law enforcement officers in schools is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, although not one that affects American schools even-
ly. In the 1990s, a shift in federal policies contributed significantly to the rise of 
the school-to-prison pipeline and the growth of a law-enforcement presence in 
schools. Following the mass shooting at Columbine High School in 1999, the 
federal government provided a surge in funding for law enforcement officers in 
schools,33 which was renewed in 2012 following the mass shooting at Sandy 
Hook elementary school in Connecticut.34 In addition, the Gun-Free Schools 
Act of 1994, a federal law, required the adoption of zero-tolerance policies for 
certain offenses.35 As a result, law enforcement officers are now present in 
schools of all types, but more common in large schools and urban high 
schools.36 In the 2013–14 school year, 44,000 part-time and full-time onsite law 
enforcement officers were present in the nation’s schools.37 In the same year, 
out of 90,000 public schools, 46 percent of high schools, 42 percent of middle 
schools, and 18 percent of elementary schools reported the presence of at least 
one law enforcement officer in their school to the US Department of Educa-
tion.38 Black and Latino high-school and middle-school students are more like-
ly than white and Asian students to attend schools with a law enforcement 
presence.39 
Despite their common presence, there is little uniformity the role of law en-
forcement officers in schools. As one sociologist observed, “there is no typical 
school officer.”40 Their duties range from patrolling the halls, monitoring metal 
detectors, and responding to calls for assistance from teachers and other educa-
                                                        
32  See AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF FEAR 9–10 
(2010). 
33  See id. at 29–30. 
34  NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, School Resource Officers: Law Enforcement Offic-
ers in Schools, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 1 (2013). 
35  See JUDITH KAFKA, THE HISTORY OF “ZERO TOLERANCE” IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLING 
2 (2011); KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 30; Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison 
Pipeline, supra note 25, at 932–33. 
36  JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 34, at 6. 
37  Blad & Harwin, supra note 8. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. More specifically, Education Week found as follows: 
Education Week’s data analysis found that 74 percent of black high school students attend a 
school with at least one on-site law enforcement officer, compared with 71 percent of both His-
panic and multiracial high school students, and 65 percent of both Asian and white high school 
students. The disparity is more pronounced at the middle school level, where 59 percent of black 
students attend schools with law enforcement, compared with 49 percent of both Hispanic and 
multiracial students, 47 percent of white students, and 40 percent of Asian students. 
Id. 
40  KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 82; see also JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 34, at 2 
(“[SROs’] activities can be placed into three general categories: (1) safety expert and law 
enforcer, (2) problem solver and liaison to community resources, and (3) educator.”). 
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tional staff to completing paperwork, counseling students, and engaging in ex-
tracurricular school activities.41 Moreover, while some school districts and po-
lice departments have formal agreements specifically outlining the duties of po-
lice officers in schools, others do not, which creates tremendous variance 
across the nation’s schools.42 In sum, in this growing field—the fastest growing 
segment of the law enforcement industry as of 200843—there is incredible vari-
ety. 
The impact of these officers in schools also varies tremendously. Remark-
ably, there is no rigorous research suggesting that the presence of law enforce-
ment officers reduces school violence.44 And the role of police in schools has 
grown despite a consistent decrease in school crime in recent years.45 
Law enforcement practices in schools can also significantly impact the cul-
ture of discipline within a school, influencing how students perceive authority 
and, ultimately, whether the school’s climate makes misbehavior more or less 
likely.46 To reduce misbehavior, schools must establish positive environments 
where students feel valued.47 But research reveals that the aggressive use of law 
enforcement tactics in schools often has precisely the opposite effect.48 
                                                        
41  KUPCHICK, supra note 32, at 83; see also Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling 
Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 977, 979, 990 (2009) (noting, in reporting results of interviews with school police 
chiefs and school resources officers in 16 Massachusetts school districts, that visions for po-
licing in school varied tremendously, from “the extended-beat approach (regarding SROs as 
law enforcement handling crime), or the caseworker approach (regarding SROs as case 
workers with law enforcement powers, who promote a high quality of life for teens and 
schools).”). 
42  See, e.g., Ofer, supra note 5, at 1394–97 (describing memorandum of understanding gov-
erning relationship between the New York City Police Department and New York City De-
partment of Education); Thurau & Wald, supra note 41, at 991. 
43  Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School Discipline in 
the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIM. 79, 82 (2008). 
44  See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 34, at 9 (reviewing literature and noting that as of 
2011, there were no published studies of SRO programs that “collect[ed] data on reliable and 
objective outcome measures during a treatment period . . . and a control period”). 
45  Aaron Kupchik summarizes the recent data on crime in schools as follows: 
Despite common rhetoric about the growing dangers inside schools, school crime has been de-
clining over the past two decades. In 1992, the rate of crime against students (both violent and 
non-violent combined) at school was 144 incidents per 1,000 students. By 2005, the rate had 
dropped to 57 per 1,000 students. In fact, schools are among the safest places for youth to be; 
students are much more likely to be affected by violent crime outside of school than inside. 
KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 15. 
46  Id. at 7–8 (“By enacting overly harsh punishments, failing to listen to students when they 
get in trouble, denying them a voice in shaping school rules or in how they are treated in 
school, and inconsistently enforcing rules, schools damage the perceived legitimacy of 
school rules and punishments, thereby making misbehavior more likely.”). 
47  Aaron Kupchik, a criminologist and sociologist, summarizes the relevant research as fol-
lows: 
A . . . consistent theme in this research is that schools can reduce student misbehavior by creat-
ing an inclusive, democratic, or positive psycho-social climate for students. . . . A number of 
studies conclude that when schools are able to create a climate that rewards positive behaviors, 
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In particular, the available research that specifically explores the impact of 
arrest practices in schools suggests that the mere presence of law enforcement 
officers increases the likelihood that normal juvenile misbehavior typically re-
quiring a trip to the principal’s office instead ends up involving handcuffing 
and a trip to the police precinct. An empirical study of data from the U.S. De-
partment of Education’s 2009–2010 School Survey on Crime and Safety49 
found that “regular contact with SROs is related to increased odds of referring 
students to law enforcement for lower-level offenses that school administrators 
and teachers should address themselves using pedagogically sound disciplinary 
methods.”50 This conclusion “hold[s] true . . . even after controlling for varia-
bles such as state statutes mandating referral to law enforcement, general levels 
of criminal activity and disorder, neighborhood crime, and other demographic 
variables.”51  
Additionally, a 2011 study reviewing data from several years of results 
from the same national survey found that “as schools increase their use of po-
lice officers, the percentage of crimes involving non-serious violent offenses 
that are reported to law enforcement increases.”52 A 2009 study of a single 
school district reached a similar conclusion,53 as did a previous qualitative 
study.54  
                                                                                                                                 
allows students a voice in their treatment and in school governance, maintains a sense of fairness 
among students, and treats students with respect and care, student misbehavior is reduced. 
Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted). 
48  Similar to arrests, the use of strict security measures—typically implemented by law en-
forcement officers—such as metal detectors, security cameras, and the use of random sweeps 
for contraband, can negatively impact school climate. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 
supra note 25, at 5. In a review of numerous studies, Jason Nance reported that “while strict 
security measures negatively affect the learning environment, several studies call into doubt 
whether these measures reduce school violence at all.” Id. at 21. Instead of establishing trust 
between students and educators, “a vital component to establishing a healthy climate con-
ductive to learning,” it “sends a negative message that students are harmful, dangerous, and 
prone to commit illegal, violent acts.” Id. at 19. “That message ‘sour[s] students’ attitudes 
toward school and school authorities and undermine[s] a positive, respectful academic envi-
ronment.’ ” Id. at 19–20; see also Michelle Fine et al., “Anything Can Happen with Police 
Around”: Urban Youth Evaluate Strategies of Surveillance in Public Places, 59 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 141, 154 (2003) (documenting low trust among “urban” youth in adults in positions 
of public authority, including police or security guards in schools). 
49  The survey was conducted by the US Department of Education’s National Center for Ed-
ucation Statistics and sought responses from 3,480 randomly selected schools. Nance, Stu-
dents, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 25, at 959–60. 
50  Id. at 976. 
51  Id. 
52  Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on School 
Crime and the Processing of Offender Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 1, 24 (2011). 
53  Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behav-
ior, 37 J. CRIM. JUSTICE 280, 285 (2009) (concluding that the presence of school resource 
officers increased arrest rates for disorderly conduct, but reduced them for assault and weap-
ons charges). 
54  KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 11 (“[Police officers’] presence escalates disciplinary situa-
tions, both by introducing a law-and-order mentality to the school and by facilitating the ar-
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Moreover, it is noteworthy that law enforcement tactics like arrest are more 
likely to be used against black and Latino children.55 At least for black children, 
psychological research suggests that such disparate treatment may be attributa-
ble to the black children, especially black boys, being viewed as less innocent 
and older than their white peers.56 This dynamic has been found to be true spe-
cifically among police officers.57 
A leading theory about why the presence of law enforcement officers leads 
to higher arrest rates for minor offenses is that law enforcement officers tend to 
define misbehavior as criminal, even though educators would not. Officers of-
ten have carte blanche to address misbehavior as they roam school hallways, 
but their presence can escalate situations.58 Jason Nance has described this dy-
namic as follows: 
[M]any SROs also become involved in student disciplinary matters that educa-
tors traditionally have handled and should continue to handle. It is easy to see 
how this happens. Most SROs spend their time each day patrolling buildings and 
grounds, investigating complaints, minimizing disruptions, and maintaining or-
der. When SROs observe students being disruptive and disorderly, they inter-
vene because they view this as one of their duties, even when those duties over-
lap with the traditional duties of school officials. . . . [I]f a student is involved in 
a scuffle with another student, talks back to a teacher, yells at another student, 
steals another student’s pencil, or exhibits other types of poor behavior, SROs 
have legal authority to arrest that student, even a six-year old student who is 
throwing a temper tantrum. Thus, in many schools, SROs have become the “new 
authoritative agents” of discipline.59 
                                                                                                                                 
rest of students whose crimes may otherwise have been considered too minor to warrant call-
ing the police (e.g., involvement in a fistfight)”). 
55  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDU. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION 
DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 1, at 1 (2014) (“While black students 
represent 16% of student enrollment, they represent 27% of students referred to law en-
forcement and 31% of students subjected to a school-related arrest. In comparison, white 
students represent 51% of enrollment, 41% of students referred to law enforcement, and 39% 
of those arrested.”). 
56  See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing 
Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 539–40 (2014); see also 
REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ 
CHILDHOOD 11 (2017); Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, How Masculinities Dis-
tribute Power: The Influence of Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 187, 200, 209 (2013) (ex-
plaining that the “ ‘boys will be boys’ ” attitude that excuses the misbehavior of white boys 
does not apply to black and Latino boys). 
57  Kristin Henning, Boys to Men: The Role of Policing in the Socialization of Black Boys, in 
POLICING THE BLACK MAN 57 (Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) [hereinafter Henning, Boys to 
Men]. 
58  KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 83, 99 (“In allowing the officer to help deal with potential and 
actual problems, the school is complicit in redefining behavioral problems as criminal prob-
lems.”). 
59  Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 25, at 949–50 
(footnotes omitted). 
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In short, as Kristin Henning has observed: “The problem is that police are 
always police.”60 
Thus, while a teacher or principal might counsel a misbehaving student, 
law enforcement officers who encounter similar behavior may be more inclined 
to turn to law enforcement tools, such as arrest. Moreover, law enforcement of-
ficers in schools are often not school employees and thus are not accountable to 
school officials. Instead, they are accountable only to the law enforcement 
agencies that employ them, and the school administration has no power to su-
pervise or discipline them.61 In response, some school districts have adopted 
policies specifying when law enforcement officers may become involved in be-
havioral issues,62 but most have done nothing to clarify when police authority is 
appropriate for school settings. This leaves constitutional and general statutory 
provisions as the only constraints on police action in schools. 
For the punished student, the negative effects of being subjected to a sei-
zure or use of force (for example, being handcuffed, perp-walked through 
school, detained at a police precinct, and, perhaps, spending a night in jail) are 
substantial. Aside from the obvious impacts of physical pain, humiliation, and 
anxiety,63 an arrest increases the likelihood that a student will drop out of high 
school.64 And for those students who are ultimately incarcerated, the costs are 
staggering.65 
In addition, the negative impact of law enforcement responses to student 
misbehavior falls on both the punished student and other students.66 Although 
this phenomenon has been studied even less than the effect of arrest and use of 
force practices on the students subjected to them, some evidence suggests that 
this impact is significant. For example, “a recent meta-analysis of 178 individ-
ual studies assessing the effectiveness of different school-based disciplinary in-
terventions found no evidence that the use of arrest and juvenile courts to han-
                                                        
60  Henning, Boys to Men, supra note 57, at 66. 
61  Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 25, at 950–51. 
62  See, e.g., Steven C. Teske, A Study of Zero Tolerance Policies in Schools: A Multi-
Integrated Systems Approach to Improve Outcomes for Adolescents, 24 J. CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 88, 88 (2011) (finding that a multi-disciplinary ap-
proach that used a warning system for certain offenses rather than arrest reduced suspen-
sions, the felony referral rate, and number of serious weapons found on campus). 
63  See infra Section I.B for further discussion of this issue. 
64  Gary Sweeten, Who Will Graduate? Disruption of High School Education by Arrest and 
Court Involvement, 23 JUST. Q. 462, 463, 473, 477–78 (2006) (longitudinal data revealed 
that first-time arrest and court appearance in high school increased the odds of dropping out 
of high school by at least three times); see also Paul Hirschfeld, Another Way Out: The Im-
pact of Juvenile Arrests on High School Dropout, 82 SOC. EDUC. 368, 384–87 (2009) (con-
cluding in study of Chicago students that arrest in the 9th or 10th grade substantially in-
creased odds of dropping out of high school). 
65  Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 25, at 954 (sum-
marizing research demonstrating that “incarcerating juveniles limits their future educational, 
housing, employment, and military opportunities”). 
66  Kim, supra note 25, at 889–92. 
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dle school disorder reduces the occurrence of problem behavior in schools.”67 
In addition, a meta-analysis of studies on the presence of SROs in high schools 
and exclusionary discipline (that is, suspension and expulsion) revealed that the 
presence of SROs is positively correlated with higher levels of exclusionary 
discipline68 and, presumably, all of its concomitant negative effects.69 Indeed, 
frequent use of arrests and other police tactics negatively affects school climate, 
as well as increases fear and distrust among students.70 Overall, there is certain-
ly no evidence suggesting that the school climate is improved by the use of ar-
rests and force in schools.71 
In sum, empirical research on law enforcement practices in schools sug-
gests that such practices are detrimental to the school environment. The mere 
presence of law enforcement officers likely increases the chance that minor 
misbehavior will result in arrest or referral to the criminal justice system. This 
criminalization approach negatively impacts school climates, harming not just 
the punished students, but their classmates as well. 
B. The Unique Characteristics and Vulnerabilities of Juveniles 
Those who study the lives and minds of juveniles—social scientists, neuro-
scientists, and psychologists among them—have conducted a variety of re-
search showing how juveniles are different from adults in a variety of ways that 
are relevant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Over thirty years of research 
                                                        
67  Id. at 891 (citing Philip J. Cook et al., School Crime Control and Prevention, 39 CRIME & 
JUST. 313, 369 (2010)). 
68  Benjamin W. Fisher & Emily A. Hennessy, School Resource Officers and Exclusionary 
Discipline in U.S. High Schools: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 1 ADOLESCENT 
RES. REV. 217, 229 (2016). 
69  See Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 25 at 956 
(footnotes omitted) (“One . . . should not underestimate the negative impact of suspending or 
expelling a student. Excluding a student from school, even for a short time period, disrupts 
that student’s educational experience and provides that student with more time and opportu-
nities to engage in harmful or illegal activities.”). 
70  KUPCHIK, supra note 32, at 115; Matthew J. Mayer & Peter E. Leone, A Structural Analy-
sis of School Violence and Disruption: Implications for Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & 
TREATMENT CHILD. 333, 349 (1999); see also Irwin A. Hyman & Donna C. Perone, The 
Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices That May Contribute to 
Student Misbehavior, 36 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 7, 18 (1998) (noting that witnessing corporal pun-
ishment, which can be likened to forceful arrests or other uses of force, can have the same 
negative impact as receiving it); Brett G. Stoudt et al., Growing Up Policed in the Age of 
Aggressive Policing Policies, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1331, 1357–58 (2011) (describing 
negative impact of witnessing police harassment on youth, including in school). 
71  Kim, supra note 25, at 891; see also id. at 892 (“[I]t can hardly be argued that school-
based arrest is ‘a valuable educational device’ or has ‘long been an accepted method of pro-
moting good behavior and instilling notions of responsibility . . . into the mischievous heads 
of school children.’ ” (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975); Ingraham v. 
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977))). 
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reveals that “adolescents are not simply miniature adults.”72 Instead, there are 
“significant disparities between adolescent and adult capacity—cognitively, 
psychosocially and . . . neurologically.”73 This research suggests that youth who 
act out in school may not do so to disrupt the school environment, but because 
misbehavior is simply an unavoidable and expected feature of adolescence. 
Of particular importance, adolescents differ from adults in their ability to 
assess risk,74 their ability to think independently and resist peer pressure, their 
ability to identify and consider future consequences, their ability to regulate 
their emotions, and their heightened reactions to fear.75 Notably, “youth’s psy-
                                                        
72  Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
143, 153 (2003). 
73  Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due Process, Auton-
omy, and Paternalism in Balance, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 23 (2012) [hereinafter 
Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham]; see also id. (“Cognitive capacity involves logical 
reasoning and the ability to identify and weigh competing alternatives of a given choice, 
while psychosocial development involves social, emotional, and temporal perceptions and 
judgments. Neurological development involves the maturation of the brain and brain func-
tioning over time.” (citing Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Les-
sons from Development Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 291, 303–04 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz, eds., 2000))); 
Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and Juve-
nile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 812 (2005). 
74  Two commentators have summarized the research findings on adolescents and risk as fol-
lows: 
Risk-taking is the result of normal reward-seeking behavior and should be anticipated as part of 
the normal developmental process. Researchers propose a “dual systems model” to explain ado-
lescent risk-taking. The model consists of a socio-emotional system and a cognitive control sys-
tem, where the socio-emotional system explains reward-seeking behavior and the cognitive con-
trol system is responsible for impulse control. Adolescence marks the period where the 
structures comprising these two systems are developing at different paces, with reward-seeking 
areas preceding areas responsible for impulse control. Consistently, research findings from neu-
robiology support the notion that risky behavior in adolescence is attributable, in part, to an im-
mature cognitive control system that cannot regulate the more mature socio-emotional or re-
ward-seeking system. Research from animal models and human brain-imaging studies supports 
this distinction. 
Jennifer Lynn-Whaley & Arianna Gard, The Neuroscience Behind Misbehavior: Reimagin-
ing How Schools Discipline Youth, in KEEPING KIDS IN SCHOOL AND OUT OF COURTS: A 
COLLECTION OF REPORTS TO INFORM THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT ON SCHOOL-JUSTICE 
PARTNERSHIPS 26, 27–28 (2012) (internal citations omitted). 
75  Taylor-Thompson, supra note 72, at 153–55. A brief excerpt of Kim Taylor-Thompson’s 
more thorough summary of this literature follows: 
Adolescents assess risk differently than adults. . . . Interestingly, adolescents experience greater 
concern—and anxiety—over the consequences of refusing to engage in risky conduct than adults 
do, thanks to greater fear of being socially ostracized. . . . 
[A]dolescents use information less effectively, and tend to exhibit less independent thinking in 
their decision-making, than adults. In situations where adults will likely perceive and weigh mul-
tiple alternatives as part of rational decision-making, adolescents typically see only one option. 
This inflexible “either-or-mentality” becomes especially acute under stressful conditions. Psy-
chologists have found that when adolescents feel cornered, their immaturity may impede their 
ability to see an alternate course of action and prod them into making a decision inconsistent 
with their moral values. . . . 
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chosocial deficiencies persist well into late adolescence and often into early 
adulthood.”76  
While these observations apply to juveniles in general, special attention 
should be devoted to the unique cognitive and psychosocial characteristics of 
youths who have experienced trauma. As described in a recent report published 
by the U.S. Department of Justice, exposure to trauma “can permanently rewire 
[children’s] brains” in ways that impact their interactions with law enforce-
ment.77 Such children experience “increas[ed] . . . fear and anxiety,” which 
sometimes “causes them to be hyperresponsive to frightening situations in both 
their physiology and their observable behavior.”78 That is, some youth engage 
in behavior that is labeled insubordinate or aggressive, but stems from their 
traumatic experiences.79 Moreover, it suggests that for some youth, actions la-
beled as misbehavior is simply unavoidable,80 and that the appropriate law-
enforcement response is one of extraordinary care.81 
But for all children and adolescents, not just those who have been subject-
ed to trauma, the risks of handcuffing and other forms of restraint are signifi-
cant. In a campaign against the indiscriminate shackling of juveniles during 
court proceedings, the National Juvenile Defender Center collected testimony 
                                                                                                                                 
[D]ifferences in the development of perspective—the ability to think about future consequences 
and to evaluate one’s actions as they affect others—emerge when examining adolescent and 
adult decisions. Adolescents, more than adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater 
weight to short-term consequences of decisions. . . . 
Finally, one recent study indicates that youth offending may stem from psychosocial factors that 
affect adolescent judgment more profoundly than adult decision-making. . . . These researchers 
concluded that “[o]n average, adolescents make poorer (more antisocial) decisions than adults do 
because they are more psychologically immature.” 
Id. at 153–55 (footnotes omitted). 
76  Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham, supra note 73, at 24 (citing Elizabeth Scott, 
Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in YOUTH 
ON TRIAL, supra note 73, at 304–05). 
77  Richard G. Dudley, Jr., Childhood Trauma and Its Effects: Implications for Police, NEW 
PERSPECTIVES POLICING 1, 5 (2015). 
78  Id. It is also noteworthy that risk of exposure to trauma does not fall evenly across Ameri-
can neighborhoods. Instead, poor children from violent neighborhoods are more likely to 
experience trauma and its related challenges. Id. at 10. 
79  Id. at 7 (explaining that adolescents often display “a tough, ‘I don’t care about anything’ 
façade” in place of the intense anxiety and fear they experience, resulting in the outward dis-
play of hostility and threatening behavior); Cheryl Smithgall et al., Responding to Students 
Affected by Trauma: Collaboration Across Public Systems, in KEEPING KIDS IN SCHOOL AND 
OUT OF COURT: A COLLECTION OF REPORTS TO INFORM THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT 
ON SCHOOL-JUSTICE PARTNERSHIPS 40, 43 (2012) (“Just as trauma may impair cognitive 
functioning, it may also lead to difficulties with social and behavioral functioning that mani-
fest as often-misunderstood behavioral problems in the classroom. Students may display be-
haviors that are impulsive, aggressive, or defiant.”). 
80  Of course, reckless behavior is common to all youth. See Henning, Boys to Men, supra 
note 57, at 75 (“Reckless behavior is so common among adolescents that it has been de-
scribed as ‘virtually a normative characteristic of adolescent development.’ ”). 
81  Dudley, supra note 77, at 6–7 (suggesting that calm attempts to de-escalate may be neces-
sary when dealing with youth suffering the ill-effects of trauma). 
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from numerous psychiatrists, psychologists, and pediatricians about the impact 
of shackling on children and adolescents. They reported that shackling can 
cause physical harm such as cuts and bruises in physically healthy children, or 
more serious injuries in children with limited mobility or prior nerve or vessel 
damage.82 Given the public nature of shackling in court, shackling can lead to 
humiliation, as well as feelings of powerlessness and self-blame.83 For youth 
who have experienced trauma, shackling can reinforce the effects of prior 
traumas.84 
These findings suggest that youth are especially vulnerable to the use of 
force and arrests in schools. Although all arrestees and those subjected to the 
use of force experience physical and mental harm, the harm is likely exacerbat-
ed in K–12 school students. This is even more likely for students who have ex-
perienced trauma.85  
As described in Part II, infra, courts frequently assume that law enforce-
ment officers contribute positively to the school environment, although the evi-
dence recounted above suggests that, in fact, their presence negatively impacts 
school climate and leads to criminalization of minor misconduct. Additionally, 
courts invoke rules created in the street-policing context in cases involving 
youth in schools without understanding the different impact that the aggressive 
arrest and force practices have on youth. The empirical evidence described 
above demonstrates the fallacy of these analyses. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARDS ON SEIZURES AND 
USES OF FORCE IN SCHOOLS 
Fourth Amendment doctrine is one of the main legal constraints on law en-
forcement officers operating in schools. Ideally, this doctrine would account for 
the unique characteristics of schools and juveniles, especially the harms to 
which both school climate and youth are uniquely vulnerable. But Fourth 
                                                        
82  Affidavit of Dr. Gwen Wurm at ¶ 16, (Jan. 7, 2015), http://njdc.info/campaign-against-
indiscriminate-juvenile-shackling [https://perma.cc/TY3B-JK4N]; Affidavit of Dr. Marty 
Beyer at ¶ 21–22 (Jan. 15, 2015), http://njdc.info/campaign-against-indiscriminate-juvenile-
shackling [https://perma.cc/CHX4-EE2K]. 
83  Affidavit of Dr. Marty Beyer, supra note 82, at ¶ 9–10; Affidavit of Dr. Gwen Wurm, su-
pra note 82, at ¶ 11, 14; Affidavit of Dr. Donald Rosenblitt at ¶ 11, (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://njdc.info/campaign-against-indiscriminate-juvenile-shackling [https://perma.cc/FC72-
3ZVW]; Affidavit of Dr. Robert Bidwell at ¶ 11, (Feb. 12, 2015), http://njdc.info/campaign-
against-indiscriminate-juvenile-shackling [https://perma.cc/MM6V-4MQT]. 
84  Affidavit of Dr. Gwen Wurm, supra note 82, at ¶ 13; Affidavit of Dr. Donald Rosenblitt, 
supra note 83, at ¶ 12; Affidavit of Dr. Eugene Griffin at ¶ 19, (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://njdc.info/campaign-against-indiscriminate-juvenile-shackling 
[https://perma.cc/2UUV-RPBM]; Affidavit of Dr. Julian Ford at ¶ 13, (Dec. 11, 2014), 
http://njdc.info/campaign-against-indiscriminate-juvenile-shackling [https://perma.cc/8TCU-
JTPM]; Affidavit of Dr. Robert Bidwell, supra note 83, at ¶ 8. 
85  Given these findings, it is unsurprising that at least 75 percent of youth in the juvenile jus-
tice system have experienced trauma. See Smithgall et al., supra note 79, at 42 (citation 
omitted). 
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Amendment jurisprudence on seizures and uses of force in schools is best de-
scribed as incoherent. Utilizing “blind balancing,” an analytic approach resting 
on little data or empirical study,86 courts considering cases in this realm often 
rely on incorrect assumptions rather than evidence. While the Supreme Court 
has decided numerous cases concerning searches in schools, it has never decid-
ed a case concerning seizures of juveniles or uses of force in schools. A review 
of the lower courts’ treatment of this issue makes the high Court’s lack of atten-
tion apparent.  
The first two Sections below review Supreme Court precedents that bear 
on the application of the Fourth Amendment to seizures and uses of force in 
schools. Section A focuses on the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 
schools, led by New Jersey v. T.L.O.; and Section B reviews Graham v. Con-
nor, the case announcing the standard typically used to evaluate use-of-force 
claims. 
Section C reviews appellate cases involving seizures and uses of force ef-
fected by law enforcement officers in schools. Section C also discusses a feder-
al district court’s finding regarding the Birmingham Police Department’s use of 
mace on high school students. The review reveals a wide variety of decisional 
approaches in similar cases. For example, some rely heavily on T.L.O., while 
some ignore it altogether. Overall, courts are failing to recognize that the school 
context and unique vulnerabilities of youth matter. Accordingly, courts are 
blind to the harms that law enforcement’s presence can inflict on both school 
communities and youth. 
A. T.L.O.: The Supreme Court’s First Foray into the Fourth Amendment in 
Schools 
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment offered any protection to students against searches conducted by 
school officials in schools.87 T.L.O. sought the suppression of incriminating ev-
idence uncovered in a search of her purse “that implicated [her] in marihuana 
dealing[],”88 and her later confession to selling marijuana in school. Though the 
Court initially granted certiorari to determine whether the exclusionary rule 
should extend to juvenile delinquency proceedings, it later broadened its in-
quiry to determine the applicable Fourth Amendment standard for searches 
conducted by school authorities.89  
The Court grappled at some length with this question, but ultimately aban-
doned the traditional probable cause and warrant requirements for searches.90 
Instead, it adopted the balancing approach first articulated in Camara v. Munic-
                                                        
86  Baradaran, supra note 28, at 3. 
87  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
88  Id. at 328. 
89  Id. at 332–33. 
90  Id. at 337–45. 
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ipal Court, which addressed administrative (non-criminal) searches and rested 
on the overall reasonableness of the intrusion.91 That reasonableness approach 
requires consideration of “the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy 
and personal security; [and] the government’s need for effective methods to 
deal with breaches of public order.”92 
The Court next considered whether a cognizable privacy interest existed in 
the context of juveniles in public schools. It concluded that juveniles (in 
school) do, in fact, have legitimate expectations of privacy that could be violat-
ed by a search of their personal property.93 It further considered the “substantial 
interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the class-
room and on school grounds.”94 The majority highlighted the need for order-
maintenance efforts in schools, concluding that “the preservation of order and a 
proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as 
well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly per-
missible if undertaken by an adult.”95 
Holding that it needed to “strike the balance between the schoolchild’s le-
gitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to 
maintain an environment in which learning can take place,”96 the Court estab-
lished that “[t]he school setting . . . requires some modification of the level of 
suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search.”97 Borrowing heavily—
and without explanation—from its decision in Terry v. Ohio, which governs 
temporary stops,98 the Court ultimately concluded that the appropriate standard 
was “reasonableness, under all the circumstances,”99 as defined by a two-step 
test: (1) whether the action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether the 
search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances that justified the interference in the first place.100 The Court further con-
cluded as follows: 
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school 
official will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is 
                                                        
91  Id. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific 
class of searches requires ‘balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search 
entails.’ ” (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967))). For a useful 
description of the significance of the Court’s shift in Camara to a balancing approach, see 
Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect,” 56 OKLA. L. REV. 
833, 852 (2003) (describing “groundbreaking” nature of Camara decision). 
92  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. 
93  Id. at 337–38. 
94  Id. at 339. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 340. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 341. 
18 NEV. L.J. 863, KARTERON  - FINAL 5/31/18  11:12 AM 
Spring 2018] ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT 883 
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permis-
sible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objec-
tives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction.101 
Thus, after T.L.O., school officials need neither a warrant nor probable 
cause to conduct a search of a juvenile in school.  
As numerous scholars have observed, T.L.O. left more questions unan-
swered than answered.102 Particularly, although the Court identified a variety of 
factors that may be relevant to considering whether a search constitutes an un-
warranted invasion of privacy, it failed to explain how those factors are rele-
vant.103 For example, does being younger or older make a search more or less 
intrusive? Are boys or girls more sensitive to having their belongings or bodies 
searched? How does the severity of an infraction contribute to the analysis of 
whether a search is reasonable? The T.L.O. Court answered none of these ques-
tions. 
Since deciding T.L.O. in 1985, the Supreme Court has rarely accepted cas-
es raising questions about the application of Fourth Amendment standards in 
schools and has provided virtually no guidance as to how T.L.O.’s two-step test 
should be applied. It has also never directly addressed the question of appropri-
ate standards for seizures and uses of force in schools. In two cases, it consid-
ered whether random drug testing of athletes and participants in extracurricular 
activities respectively, complied with the Fourth Amendment.104 It answered in 
the affirmative both times.105  
First, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court addressed ran-
dom suspicionless drug testing of athletes, and linked T.L.O. to the “special 
needs” doctrine in the Fourth Amendment realm.106 In accordance with the typ-
                                                        
101  Id. at 341–42 (footnotes omitted). 
102  See Feld, supra note 24, at 848; Gardner, Strip Searching Students, supra note 24, at 984; 
Gardner, Student Privacy, supra note 24, at 897–98; see also Stuart C. Berman, Note, Stu-
dent Fourth Amendment Rights: Defining the Scope of the T.L.O. School-Search Exception, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1077, 1078–79 (1991). 
103  Feld, supra note 24, at 858 (noting that “the Court did not explain the practical meaning 
of those limitations—age, sex, or the nature of the infraction” or how they applied in T.L.O. 
itself); Gardner, Strip Searching Students, supra note 24, at 984 (“While Redding offered 
possible elucidation of the nature of the infraction consideration, the Supreme Court has of-
fered no guidance as to the meaning of the age and sex of the student factors.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Gardner, Student Privacy, supra note 24, at 922–23 (critiquing T.L.O.’s failure to 
explain the age, sex, and nature of the infraction factors and offering possible explanations of 
them). 
104  Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 
(2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
105  Earls, 536 U.S. at 825; Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 666. 
106  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 653 (noting that in schools, “the warrant require-
ment ‘would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary 
procedures [that are] needed,’ and ‘strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based 
upon probable cause’ would undercut ‘the substantial need of teachers and administrators for 
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ical mode of analysis in special needs cases,107 it next identified the Fourth 
Amendment interest at issue—privacy—noting that the legitimacy of an al-
leged privacy interest turns on context.108 In Vernonia, it held that the privacy 
interest was “not significant.”109 
Despite the focus on privacy, the Court also made two observations that 
apply with equal force to seizures and uses of force. First, “while children as-
suredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the 
nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school.”110 Second, 
“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ in-
quiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for 
children.”111 
On the other side of the balancing test, the Court considered the “nature 
and immediacy” of the government’s interests.112 There, the Court focused on 
the school district’s interest in combating the “[ill] effects of a drug-infested 
school,”113 which impacted the entire school community and were particularly 
pronounced given the potential “physical, psychological, and addictive effects 
of drugs.”114 In consideration of these facts, as well as “the relative unobtru-
                                                                                                                                 
freedom to maintain order in the schools.’ ” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
340–41(1985))). 
107  The special needs doctrine grew from the Court’s decision in Camara, and replaces the 
probable cause and warrant requirements with a balancing test in a variety of contexts 
“ ‘when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ” Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 
868, 873 (1987)). The Court cited numerous examples of such contexts. See id. at 653–54 
(citing, inter alia, Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)) (allowing 
suspicionless checkpoints for the purpose of identifying drunk drivers); Treasury Emps. v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding random drug testing for federal customs officers 
who carry arms or are involved in drug interdiction); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of railroad personnel involved in 
train accidents); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (allowing check-
points near international borders to allow searches for unauthorized immigrants and contra-
band). 
108  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 654 (internal citation omitted) (“What expectations 
[of privacy] are legitimate varies, of course, with context, depending, for example, upon 
whether the individual asserting the privacy interest is at home, at work, in a car, or in a pub-
lic park.”). 
109  Id. at 660. 
110  Id. at 655–56 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
111  Id. at 656. 
112  Id. at 660. 
113  Id. at 662–63 (noting that such effects were “visited not just upon the users, but upon the 
entire student body and faculty,” and holding that it could not disturb the district court’s 
findings that “ ‘a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscho-
lastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion,’ that ‘[d]isciplinary actions had reached “epidemic 
proportions,” and that ‘the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as 
by the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture’ ”). 
114  Id. at 661. 
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siveness of the search,” the Court concluded that the drug-testing program 
passed Fourth Amendment muster.115 
Although the Vernonia Court cautioned “against the assumption that suspi-
cionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other con-
texts,”116 the next case addressing this issue, Board of Education v. Earls, found 
suspicionless drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular activi-
ties constitutional.117 After noting that “[s]ecuring order in the school environ-
ment sometimes requires that students be subjected to greater controls than 
those appropriate for adults,”118 the Earls Court concluded that the drug testing 
program was constitutional as well.119 
In 2009, for the first time since T.L.O., the Court considered a Fourth 
Amendment challenge to the search of a single student rather than a policy or 
widespread school practice affecting multiple students.120 In Safford Unified 
School District No. 1 v. Redding, a thirteen-year-old girl challenged the legality 
of a strip search conducted because she allegedly possessed ibuprofen.121 The 
Court applied the T.L.O. two-step analysis, including consideration of “the age 
and sex of the student.”122 Although the Court did not explain whether there is 
an age cutoff for strip searches or whether such searches are more appropriate 
for boys or girls, it did note that young people’s “adolescent vulnerability in-
tensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure.”123 Aside from a highly fact-
bound analysis of the case at hand, the Court did not further expound on the 
meaning of the factors identified in T.L.O.124 
In these cases, the Court has devoted much attention to the privacy inter-
ests of students—although the government’s interests usually trump the stu-
dents’. This focus on privacy makes it difficult to identify precisely how the 
Court would analyze a case involving a seizure or use of force in a school. As 
                                                        
115  Id. at 664–65. 
116  Id. at 665. 
117  Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 
(2002). 
118  Id. at 831 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). 
119  Id. at 838. 
120  Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009). 
121  Id. at 368. 
122  Id. at 375. 
123  Id. (citing Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae, 6–14). 
Justice Ginsburg made a similar observation. See id. at 382 (“Here, ‘the nature of the [sup-
posed] infraction,’ the slim basis for suspecting Savana Redding, and her ‘age and sex,’ es-
tablish beyond doubt that Assistant Principal Wilson’s order cannot be reconciled with this 
Court’s opinion in T.L.O.” (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration 
in original) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342)). 
124  Id. at 375–77 (holding that the search was not reasonable in scope because “the content 
of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion,” and there was no “indication of 
danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity,” nor “any reason to sup-
pose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear”). 
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described further in Part III, the interests implicated by seizures and uses of 
force—dignity, autonomy, bodily integrity, and “locomotion”125—differ sub-
stantially from searches, which primarily implicate privacy. In the same vein, 
the Court has not addressed whether the governmental interests identified in 
T.L.O., Vernonia, Earls, and Safford—primarily order-maintenance and com-
bating illegal drug use—are relevant to Fourth Amendment analyses concern-
ing seizures and uses of force rather than searches. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Vernonia that “the nature of 
[Fourth Amendment] rights is what is appropriate for children in school,”126 
and that “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial 
and tutelary responsibility for children”127 would appear to apply in equal 
measure to cases involving seizures and uses of force. The lower courts seem, 
however, to have missed these critical holdings. 
B. Graham v. Connor: Setting the Standard for Excessive Force 
Aside from T.L.O., Graham v. Connor has played the largest role in resolv-
ing Fourth Amendment excessive force challenges brought by students. Al-
though the Supreme Court has never invoked Graham v. Connor in a case in-
volving Fourth Amendment standards in schools, the lower courts frequently 
do so. 
Graham v. Connor settled a lingering dispute in the federal courts: whether 
the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause provided protection against 
the use of excessive force “in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, 
or other ‘seizure’ of [one’s] person.”128 Rejecting a “generalized ‘excessive 
force’ standard,”129 the Court located the right to be free from excessive force 
in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of “the right ‘to be secure in their per-
sons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures,’ ” rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive due process standard.130 
The Court further determined that the Fourth Amendment “requires a care-
ful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing government interests at 
stake,”131 and ultimately, consideration of the totality of the circumstances.132 
                                                        
125  See infra notes 268–69 and accompanying text. 
126  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
127  Id. at 656. 
128  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
129  Id. at 394 (citing Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1, 7–22 (1985)). 
130  Id. The Court offered a limited explanation for its choice of the Fourth Amendment over 
the Due Process Clause: that “the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct.” Id. 
at 395. 
131  Id. at 396 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 496, 703 
(1983)). 
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The Court identified three specific factors requiring consideration: “the severity 
of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safe-
ty of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or at-
tempting to evade arrest by flight.”133 It also concluded that “[t]he ‘reasonable-
ness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight.”134 Citing cases involving seizures rather than uses of force, the Court al-
so declared that the “ ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is an 
objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively rea-
sonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without re-
gard to their underlying intent or motivation.”135 
The Court offered no explanation for the adoption of an objective test in 
the use of force context, and, again citing a case involving a seizure rather than 
the use of force, simply declared that “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not 
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of 
force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable 
use of force constitutional.”136 The Court ultimately announced that “subjective 
concepts like ‘malice’ and ‘sadism’ have no proper place” in the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of force.137 
Since deciding Graham, the Supreme Court has rarely explained how to 
apply the standard it articulated.138 In one of the few cases in which it directly 
decided the constitutionality of a use of force, the Court eschewed the Graham 
factors, and appeared to apply a general reasonableness test.139 That said, lower 
courts continue to rely heavily on the Graham factors. 
As numerous commentators have observed, the Graham “objective reason-
ableness” standard offers little direction to lower courts, police officers, and 
                                                                                                                                 
132  Id. (“Because ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 
precise definition or mechanical application,’ . . . its proper application requires careful at-
tention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case[.]” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979))). 
133  Id. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9). 
134  Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)). 
135  Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978); Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21). 
136  Id. (citing Scott, 436 U.S. at 138). 
137  Id. at 399. The Court did note that an officer’s intent in using force may be relevant to 
analyzing an officer’s credibility in recounting the relevant circumstances. Id. at 399 n.12. 
138  The most common scenario the Court has addressed is the use of force in the context of a 
high-speed car chase by police officers that resulted in death or serious injury. See Mullenix 
v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 306–09 (2015) (per curiam); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 
2017, 2020 (2014); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 372 (2007). Other cases have addressed 
application of the Graham standard in the context of qualified immunity inquiries. See, e.g., 
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015); Brosseau v. Haugen, 
543 U.S. 194, 197 (2004) (per curiam). 
139  Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (“[W]e must . . . slosh our way through the factbound morass of 
‘reasonableness.’ ”). 
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any other party attempting to discern whether and when using force is appro-
priate.140 Instead, “courts must ‘slosh’ their way through the ‘factbound morass’ 
without galoshes or a compass, which is to say, with almost no direction at all 
about what constitutes reasonable force.”141 
This observation unquestionably applies to cases concerning the use of 
force against students in schools. And, as explained below, lower courts fre-
quently invoke Graham in cases involving uses of force in schools without 
considering whether the school context or youthfulness of the subject of force 
require any modification of the standard. This Article suggests that courts 
should rethink the “reasonableness” standard to ensure that those critical cir-
cumstances are part of the analysis. 
C. What T.L.O. and Graham Wrought: Confusion in the Lower Courts 
In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on how to address sei-
zures and uses of force against juveniles in school, there is considerable confu-
sion in the lower courts about how to appropriately address the thorny Fourth 
Amendment questions presented when law enforcement officers enter 
schools—whether schools are their usual workplaces, or they are responding to 
requests for assistance. A review of the cases of this kind reveals two common, 
but incorrect, assumptions: (1) that the use of law enforcement tactics in 
schools is positive, or at least benign, because such tactics maintain order and 
foster an environment conducive to learning; and (2) that seizures and uses of 
force as law enforcement tools can be used interchangeably among adults and 
children with the same effects and consequences. Both underlie an analytic ap-
proach that does not consider whether the rationales for those rules and stand-
ards appropriately account for the unique interests at stake in cases involving 
schools and youth.  
A review of state and federal appellate cases involving seizures and uses of 
force effected by law enforcement officers in schools is below. This section al-
so discusses a federal district court’s findings regarding the use of mace on 
Birmingham high school students by the Birmingham Police Department. 
1. Seizures by Law Enforcement Officers in Schools 
Although the Supreme Court did not specify how its analysis in T.L.O. 
should apply to seizures, numerous federal courts considering Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to seizures of students in schools have characterized their 
                                                        
140  See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1119, 1127 (2008); Jill I. Brown, Comment, Defining “Reasonable” Police Misconduct: 
Graham v. Connor and Excessive Force During Arrest, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1286 
(1991). 
141  Harmon, supra note 140, at 1139–40. 
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treatment of such claims as following T.L.O.,142 and state courts have followed 
suit.143 The vast majority have done so without analyzing the differences be-
                                                        
142  See Ziegler v. Martin Cty. Sch. Dist., 831 F.3d 1309, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The 
initial detention of the students on the party bus for breathalyzer testing meets the T.L.O. 
standard of being justified at its inception, because it was reasonably related to the circum-
stances that caused the detention: to determine if students on the party bus had been drink-
ing.” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985))); C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 
F.3d 1005, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (assumed “T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard ap-
plie[d]” and held that “[w]hen analyzing whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated, we must determine whether the seizure was reasonable under ‘all the circum-
stances’ ” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341)); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 
1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e apply the reasonableness standard articulated in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42, 105 S.Ct. 733, 742–43, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), to 
school seizures by law enforcement officers.”); Shuman ex rel. Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. 
Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing decisions by the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Tenth Circuits and holding, “[w]e join these courts of appeals in finding seizures in the 
public school context to be governed by the reasonableness standard, giving special consid-
eration to the goals and responsibilities of our public schools”); Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 
318, 326 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The facts of T.L.O. involved only a search. But the policies under-
lying that decision easily support its extension to seizures of students by school officials. . . . 
We thus address appellants’ claim of illegal seizure under the rubric announced in T.L.O.”); 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Hawaii Dep’t. of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003) (not-
ing that T.L.O. “considered the reasonableness of a search in a school,” and citing it to ana-
lyze “the reasonableness of the seizure . . . in light of the educational objectives [the teacher] 
was trying to achieve”); Milligan v. City of Slidell, 226 F.3d 652, 654–55 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“Because this case involves the rights of students in a public school, a full bore Terry analy-
sis is inappropriate. . . . The reasonableness inquiry must take into account the schools’ ‘cus-
todial and tutelary responsibility for children.’ Furthermore, students in the school environ-
ment have a ‘lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.’ ” 
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995))); Wallace ex rel. 
Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in T.L.O., discipline is crucial to education and education . . . is necessary 
for freedom, depriving students of some liberty is linked to the ultimate liberation of the stu-
dent. Moreover, flexibility in discipline is necessary to preserve the informality of the stu-
dent-teacher relationship.” (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340)); Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 55 F.3d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]hile school officials are subject to the limita-
tions of the fourth amendment, the reasonableness of seizures must be determined in light of 
all of the circumstances, with particular attention being paid to whether the seizure was justi-
fied at its inception and reasonable in scope.”); Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 
882, 884 (10th Cir. 1989) (“We believe that the same considerations which moved the Su-
preme Court to apply a relaxed Fourth Amendment standard in cases involving school 
searches support applying the same standard in school seizure cases.”). 
143  Hunt v. State, 69 A.3d 360, 366 (Del. 2013) (footnotes omitted) (following citation of 
T.L.O., describing standard for seizures as follows: “Several appellate courts, including the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that seizures in public schools are valid if reason-
able, ‘giving special consideration to the goals and responsibilities of our public schools,’ 
especially with regard to disciplinary matters. A child’s age is one of the circumstances to be 
considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a seizure.”); In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 246 
(Cal. 2001) (citing T.L.O., but holding that “detentions of minor students on school grounds 
do not offend the Constitution, so long as they are no arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpos-
es of harassment”); M.D. v. State, 65 So.3d 563, 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“As the Su-
preme Court noted in T.L.O., the critical determination under the Fourth Amendment is 
whether the actions of the school officials were reasonable in light of all the circumstanc-
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tween searches and seizures, instead sometimes modifying (modestly) T.L.O.’s 
two-part test, which requires inquiry into whether a search was justified at its 
inception and reasonable in scope.144  
Courts have not generally distinguished the standards to be applied in con-
sideration of the actor effectuating the seizure, for example, a teacher who 
taped a student to a tree,145 or a SRO (there, a sheriff’s deputy) who handcuffed 
an eleven-year-old girl in response to misbehavior.146 Only a handful of cases 
addressing the standards for seizures in schools involved law enforcement per-
sonnel rather than school officials.  
Among the many state and federal appellate cases addressing Fourth 
Amendment claims regarding seizures in schools, four that illustrate the variety 
of approaches to these cases are described below. Three claim to be following 
T.L.O. in three different ways, and attempt to account for the uniqueness of the 
school context in identifying the appropriate standard, while the other does not 
even cite it. Only one considers the young age of the student seized as a factor 
in determining the constitutionality of the seizure. In sum, the cases reflect the 
lower courts’ divergent approaches and illustrate the incoherence of the juris-
prudence in this area. 
The Eleventh Circuit has declared that the T.L.O. two-step approach ap-
plies in cases involving seizures as well as searches.147 In Gray ex rel. Alexan-
der v. Bostic, the court considered the claim of a nine-year-old girl who said 
something disrespectful to a coach during gym class—characterized by the 
court as a “verbal threat,”148 even though the coach to whom the statement was 
directed said that she did not feel threatened by the student,149 and another 
                                                                                                                                 
es.”); T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing T.L.O. and holding “we 
conclude that the proper test for determining whether a school police officer was justified in 
removing a student from his or her class is whether such an intrusion was reasonable”); J.D. 
v. State, 920 So.2d 117, 119, 122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (describing T.L.O. as “the start-
ing point for the Fourth Amendment analysis” and analyzing seizure by reviewing “[w]hat is 
reasonable under all of the circumstances”); People v. Kline, 824 N.E.2d 295, 299–300 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2005) (citing T.L.O. and holding that reasonable suspicion standards applies to sei-
zures in schools); State v. Crystal B., 24 P.3d 771, 774 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (citing T.L.O. 
for the proposition that “the legality of a search of a student depends on the reasonableness, 
under all the circumstances, of the search,” and appearing to apply reasonableness standard 
to seizure claim). 
144  The only major exception is the Seventh Circuit, which, when analyzing the seizure of a 
student, considered how searches and seizures differ, particularly in the school context. Wal-
lace, 68 F.3d at 1014. The court concluded that “in the context of a public school, a teacher 
or administrator who seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only 
when the restriction of liberty is unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and ap-
parent.” Id. 
145  Doe, 334 F.3d at 907. 
146  Gray, 458 F.3d at 1301. 
147  Id. at 1305. 
148  Id. (“It is undisputed that Deputy Bostic witnessed Gray threaten to do something physi-
cally to her teacher.”). 
149  Id. at 1302. 
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coach told the SRO who overheard the “threat” that the officer’s intervention 
was unnecessary.150 In response, the SRO took the girl outside of the gym and 
handcuffed her, saying “[T]his is how it feels when you break the law,” and 
“[T]his is how it feels to be in jail.”151 The officer reportedly detained and 
handcuffed the girl “ ‘to impress upon her the serious nature of committing 
crimes that can lead to arrest, detention or incarceration,’ and ‘to help persuade 
her to rid herself of her disrespectful attitude.’ ”152  
Invoking T.L.O.’s two-step analysis, the court asked (1) whether the sei-
zure was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonable in scope.153 
For the first prong, it labeled the SRO’s initial action—“stopping her, and ask-
ing her questions”—an “investigatory stop,”154 announcing that its propriety 
turned on “reasonableness under the circumstances.”155 The court held that the 
SRO’s “investigatory stop” met this standard because the student had issued a 
“verbal threat,”156 which is a criminal violation under Alabama law.157  
For the second prong, the court relied heavily on T.L.O. to identify the ap-
propriate standard, simply substituting the word “seizure” for “search”: “ ‘[A 
seizure] will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reason-
ably related to the objectives of the [seizure] and not excessively intrusive in 
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’ ”158 Us-
ing slightly different language, the court then somewhat confusingly described 
the relevant query as “whether the handcuffing of nine-year-old Gray was rea-
sonably related to the scope of the circumstances which justified Deputy Bos-
tic’s initial interference and was not excessively intrusive.”159 Applying this 
standard, it concluded that the seizure was unconstitutional.160 Citing federal 
criminal cases involving adults outside of the school context, the court ob-
served that handcuffing is typically permitted during investigatory stops,161 but 
                                                        
150  Id. at 1301. 
151  Id. (alteration in original). 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 1305. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. (“[U]nder T.L.O., the level of suspicion in a school setting needed to justify a search 
or an investigatory stop is only reasonableness under the circumstances.”). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (2018)). 
158  Id. at 1305–06 (alterations in original) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 
(1985)). 
159  Id. (emphasis added). 
160  Id. at 1305–06. 
161  Id. (“[D]uring an investigatory stop, an officer can still handcuff a detainee when the of-
ficer reasonably believes that the detainee presents a potential threat to safety.” (citing Unit-
ed States v. Hastamorir, 818 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989))); United States v. Blackman, 
66 F.3d 1572, 1576–77 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790–91 
& n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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reasoned that the student’s young age, the lack of a threat to safety, and the pu-
nitive purpose of the handcuffing made the handcuffing unreasonable.162 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis reflects a hybrid approach. It both formally 
embraced the importation of traditional criminal procedure norms and concepts 
in the school context—labeling a sheriff’s deputy taking a nine-year-old girl 
aside to discuss a disrespectful statement an “investigatory stop” of a “verbal 
threat”—and modified the T.L.O. two-step approach to determine the overall 
reasonableness of the encounter, including consideration of the officer’s subjec-
tive purpose in handcuffing the student.163 This was a notable departure from 
typical Fourth Amendment analyses of seizures.164 Overall, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit recognized that this departure was appropriate given the school context and 
age of the girl subjected to the seizure,165 but it did not grapple with the differ-
ing interests at stake for seizures instead of searches in identifying the appro-
priate standard. 
In C.B. v. City of Sonora, the Ninth Circuit articulated a different standard 
for seizures in schools, invoking T.L.O., but not its two-step analysis.166 There, 
the circumstances appear relatively benign: an eleven-year-old boy, who was 
described to police officers as a “runner” who had not taken his medication and 
was “out of control,” sat quietly in a schoolyard, and did not respond to offic-
ers’ questions.167 Although the school staff at the scene did not ask for him to 
be removed, the officers did so, taking him away, handcuffed, in the back of a 
police vehicle.168 Sitting en banc, the court fractured badly; according to the 
majority, “[w]hen analyzing whether an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated [in school], we must determine whether the seizure was reasona-
ble under ‘all the circumstances.’ ”169 Relying in part on the boy’s “re-
sist[ance]”—“ignoring their questions”170—the majority concluded that the de-
fendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff “c[ould ]not 
                                                        
162  Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306. (“[A]t the time Deputy Bostic handcuffed Gray, there was no 
indication of a potential threat to anyone’s safety. . . . Deputy Bostic’s handcuffing of Gray 
was his attempt to punish Gray in order to change her behavior in the future.”); id. (“[T]he 
handcuffing was excessively intrusive given Gray’s young age and the fact that it was not 
done to protect anyone’s safety.”). 
163  Id. at 1307. 
164  See Nirej Sekhon, Purpose, Policing, and the Fourth Amendment, 107 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 65, 75 (2017) (“A search or seizure is lawful provided that the objectively ob-
servable facts give rise to individualized suspicion. . . . [I]f the objectively observable facts 
supported individualized suspicion, it does not matter that the investigating officer searched 
without subjectively believing that there was individualized suspicion.”). 
165  Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306. 
166  C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Smith, M., J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and writing for the majority for Part I of the opinion). 
167  Id. at 1034. 
168  Id. at 1031, 1035. 
169  Id. at 1034 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)). 
170  Id. 
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show that a reasonable officer would have understood that taking [the plaintiff] 
into temporary custody was unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional.”171 
The Ninth Circuit thus identified T.L.O.’s demand for reasonableness as 
the relevant standard but ignored entirely the two-part test developed for 
searches without explanation. Because it did not identify any objective criteria 
to guide its analysis, the Ninth Circuit’s decision offered virtually no guidance 
to schools, officers, or other courts on how to analyze whether a student’s sei-
zure in school constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the majority 
focused on its concern that finding the officers liable for the seizure in C.B. 
would effectively require officers to undertake investigations when called to 
schools—a requirement it deemed “unworkable”172 without explaining why in-
vestigations would be necessary or why they would be unworkable. It also ex-
pressed concern about the “risk [of] personal financial liability”173 for officers, 
while failing to address the infringement on the interests of the seized student 
and impact of unnecessary police seizures on the plaintiff or any other grade-
school students. 
The Tenth Circuit took a totally different approach, ignoring T.L.O. in its 
entirety. In A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, the underlying facts are remarkable: a 
seventh-grader who “generated several fake burps,” that “allegedly disrupt[ed] 
his physical-education class,”174 was handcuffed at school and transported to a 
precinct because he allegedly violated a statute barring “ ‘willfully interfer[ing] 
with the educational process of any public . . . school.’ ”175 The court used a 
standard Fourth Amendment analysis to determine that the arresting officer was 
entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably determined that probable 
cause to arrest existed.176 The Court’s analysis boiled down to the following 
question: “ ‘[W]hether [the officer] possessed knowledge of evidence that 
would provide probable cause to arrest [the individual] on some ground.’ ”177 
Resting on its broad interpretation of the statute that barred “interfer[ing] with 
the educational process,”178 it concluded that the officer did possess the re-
quired knowledge.179 
                                                        
171  Id. at 1034. The majority was not explicit as to whether it was deciding that that the of-
ficers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional violation, or 
whether the right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. No-
tably, this analysis disregarded the Ninth Circuit’s previous command that “[i]n applying the 
Fourth Amendment in the school context, the reasonableness of the seizure must be consid-
ered in light of the educational objectives [the teacher/administrator] was trying to achieve.” 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). 
172  C.B., 769 F.3d at 1035. 
173  Id. 
174  A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2016). 
175  Id. at 1139 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D)). 
176  Id. at 1150. 
177  Id. at 1139 (quoting Apodaca v. City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 
2006)). 
178  Id. at 1142 (“The ordinary meaning of these statutory terms would seemingly encompass 
F.M.’s conduct because F.M.’s burping, laughing, and leaning into the classroom stopped the 
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Aside from its astonishing facts, this case is noteworthy because the court 
did not even consider the school setting or the student’s young age. Instead, 
with no mention of T.L.O., the Tenth Circuit fully embraced the traditional 
qualified immunity inquiry in a case involving an arrest, requiring the interpre-
tation of a criminal statute without regard for the atypical setting or arrestee.180  
In a sharp split with the federal courts, the Supreme Court of California cit-
ed T.L.O. and Vernonia, but effectively disregarded the core principles an-
nounced in both cases.181 There, a school security officer observed a student 
acting suspiciously—by being in an area where students are not allowed to 
gather, and “fix[ing] his pocket very nervously”—followed the student to class, 
and asked him to leave class to speak with her in the hallway.182 The officer 
asked him repeatedly if he had “anything on him.”183 A consented-to “patdown 
search” revealed a knife in the student’s pocket.184  
Citing T.L.O., Vernonia, and Terry, the court concluded that the Fourth 
Amendment required “reasonableness” to assess the constitutionality of a sei-
zure in school, accomplished by “ ‘balancing the need to search [or seize] 
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’ ”185 Acknowledging 
that seizures implicate different interests than searches, it concluded that sei-
zures create only a “trivial” intrusion on students because “the minor is not free 
to move about during the school day.”186 Ultimately, the court replaced T.L.O.’s 
demand for reasonableness with its own conclusion that seizures are constitu-
tional as long as they are not “arbitrary, capricious, or for the purpose of har-
assment.”187 
The Supreme Court of California’s conclusion rests in large part on two as-
sumptions: (1) students do not have a substantial interest in freedom of move-
                                                                                                                                 
flow of student educational activities, thereby injecting disorder into the learning environ-
ment, which worked at cross-purposes with [the plaintiff’s teacher]’s planned teaching 
tasks.”). The staggering scope of routine (mis)behavior encompassed by this interpretation is 
beyond the scope of this article and worthy of separate treatment. 
179  Id. at 1150 (“[I]t would not have been clear to a reasonable officer . . . that [the] arrest of 
[the plaintiff] under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-20-13(D) would have been lacking in probable 
cause and thus violative of [the plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”). 
180  Then-Judge Gorsuch responded to the ninety-four-page opinion in a short and stinging 
dissent that technically rested on a disagreement over the meaning of a New Mexico statute, 
but also suggested that he was troubled by the aggressive use of arrest to address fake burps 
by a seventh grader in gym class. See id. at 1169–70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
181  In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 245 (Cal. 2001). 
182  Id. at 241. 
183  Id. at 242. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 245 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968)). 
186  Id. at 246. 
187  Id. (“Were we simply to extend [the reasonable suspicion] standard to the school setting, 
we would have failed utterly to accommodate the special needs existing there. Therefore, we 
conclude instead that detentions of minor students on school grounds do not offend the Con-
stitution, so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment.”). 
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ment in school, and (2) officers in schools are school personnel who do not act 
as law enforcement agents. For the first assumption, the court offered a thor-
ough recounting of the ways in which students’ movement is restricted in 
schools.188 This review led it to conclude that the intrusion created by a seizure 
was “trivial” because “the minor is not free to move about during the school 
day.”189 This is, at best, a cramped notion of students’ freedom of movement in 
school. While some schools do sharply limit the ability of students to move 
around, a seizure—perhaps accomplished by handcuffing—cannot seriously be 
thought to be a reasonable response to a student simply being out of place—for 
example, in a hallway without a pass. 
For the second assumption, the court posited that the standard for seizures 
should be devised with the understanding that criminal investigation is not usu-
ally the aim of school personnel—including the officer who detained and 
searched the student in that case—to interrupt students’ freedom of move-
ment.190 The court painted a picture of “school security officers” and traditional 
school staff as being part of one team that is separate and apart from law en-
forcement.191 But this is simply not an accurate representation of how most law 
enforcement officers function in schools, where they are typically titled “school 
resource officers” and are full-fledged members of local police or sheriff’s de-
partments. Moreover, the court failed to explain why its conclusion that the of-
ficer did not act “with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies” was rele-
vant to defining Fourth Amendment rights.192 In short, the Supreme Court of 
California did not rely on sound evidence of actual practices in the school 
where the arrest at issue took place or acknowledge the diversity of school po-
licing practices in defining the Fourth Amendment rights of California’s 
schoolchildren. 
Overall, the Supreme Court of California’s analysis paid special attention 
to the school context but painted a portrait of an extraordinarily punitive envi-
ronment—where a seizure by a school security officer may be deemed reason-
able for virtually any reason—that most Americans would not recognize. Fur-
                                                        
188  Id. at 245 (“School personnel, to maintain or promote order, may need to send students 
into and out of classrooms, define or alter schedules, summon students to the office, or ques-
tion them in the hall.”); id. at 246 (noting that a school can “require the minor’s presence on 
campus during school hours, attendance at assigned classes during their scheduled meeting 
times, appearance at assemblies in the auditorium, and participation in physical education 
classes out of doors”). 
189  Id. at 246. 
190  Id. at 245 (“[A]s the high court has observed, school officials ‘are not in the business of 
investigating violations of the criminal laws . . . and otherwise have little occasion to become 
familiar with the intricacies of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.’ ” (quoting 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989))). This observation is 
somewhat ironic given that the court explores this topic in the context of a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding against a student arrested in school by a school police officer for violat-
ing the penal code. Id. at 247 n.3. 
191  Id. at 247. 
192  Id. at 247 n.3. 
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ther, it did not pay heed to the notion that the costs imposed by seizing youth 
are different from those when seizing adults. 
In sum, appellate courts have described the standard for seizures in schools 
as one with limited constitutional protections for students, with the Fourth 
Amendment providing less robust protections for students in schools than for 
individuals in other contexts. The courts have been less uniform in offering a 
method to determine how those Fourth Amendment standards should be differ-
ent. Some courts have embraced T.L.O., at times modifying its two-step analy-
sis, while others have failed to even cite it. The result is a hodgepodge of stand-
ards across the country, which leaves students, schools, and police with an 
uncertain understanding of how the Fourth Amendment applies in schools. 
2. Uses of Force by Law Enforcement Officers in Schools 
Courts have expounded upon the relevant Fourth Amendment standards for 
claims that students have been subjected to excessive force rather haphazardly. 
Some courts blindly applied the standards for excessive force claims that apply 
to adult arrests. Others identified the school context as relevant to the analysis, 
but ultimately declined to articulate a standard for the use of force distinct from 
the standard that applies when law enforcement officers use force on adults. 
Some courts eschewed the Fourth Amendment entirely when confronting 
claims alleging the use of excessive force by educators, instead applying Four-
teenth Amendment standards.193 
Of the three federal circuits that have considered the Fourth Amendment 
standards that apply when law enforcement officers use force against students 
in school, only one has articulated a standard that attempts to adhere to the 
principles announced in T.L.O. Instead, most courts analyze use of force claims 
under the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor: 
“whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent 
or motivation.”194 
A recent Alabama federal district court case concerning a systemic chal-
lenge to police practices in schools provides a useful example of how many 
courts have eschewed the modifications to the standards for uses of force 
                                                        
193  See, e.g., T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“ ‘[E]xcessive corporal punishment, at least where not administered in conformity with a 
valid school policy authorizing corporal punishment . . . may be actionable under the Due 
Process Clause when it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking be-
havior.’ ” (quoting Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th 
Cir. 2000))); Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2001). 
For a thorough analysis of the implications of reviewing claims alleging excessive force by 
educators under the Due Process Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment, see Kathryn R. 
Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to 
Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 417–18 (2001). 
194  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 
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against juveniles in schools, and instead applied standards developed in the 
context of street-policing involving adults. It is discussed in depth below, along 
with the three federal circuit court decisions analyzing uses of force by law en-
forcement officers in schools. They are emblematic of the confusion surround-
ing the treatment of uses of force in schools in the lower courts. 
a. The Birmingham Police Department on Trial: Mace in High 
Schools 
J.W. v. Birmingham Board of Education, a federal class action, challenged 
the Birmingham Police Department’s practice of using mace against high 
school students.195 The plaintiffs alleged that Birmingham Police Department 
officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights when they used Freeze+P, a 
brand of mace “described by its manufacturer as ‘the most intense [ ] incapaci-
tating agent available today.’ ”196 Freeze+P causes “severe pain,” and was “de-
signed to temporarily incapacitate an individual by causing pain and intense tis-
sue irritation,” such as “burning of the eyes, skin, mouth, and airway, tearing, 
reflexive closing of the eyes, coughing, gagging, and difficulty breathing.”197 
At its core, the legal analysis the court used to evaluate the plaintiffs’ 
claims was the framework articulated in Graham v. Connor, and its progeny in 
the Eleventh Circuit.198 The J.W. court stated that the Fourth Amendment re-
quired a balancing of the plaintiff’s interests and “ ‘the countervailing govern-
ment interests at stake.’ ”199 It then cited two Eleventh Circuit cases for the 
proposition that courts should consider the “ ‘need for the application of force’ ” 
by “follow[ing] the factors laid out in Graham—‘the severity of the crime, the 
danger to the officer, and the risk of flight.’ ”200 It next discussed a leading 
                                                        
195  J.W. v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (N.D. Ala. 2015). The case is a 
rarity in the universe of federal cases addressing the Fourth Amendment rights of students in 
schools in two ways: (1) the plaintiffs challenged the systemic practices of a police depart-
ment in schools, rather than a single incident; and (2) the district court held a full trial on the 
merits. During the twelve day trial, the court heard testimony from, among others, eight 
plaintiffs who recounted harrowing experiences during their encounters with police officers 
in their high schools, experts on law enforcement practices, the psychological impact of the 
use of physical force against schoolchildren, and the physical effects of mace on children. Id. 
at 1127–35 (recounting plaintiffs’ testimony); id. at 1137–40 (describing opinions of medical 
and psychological experts); id. at 1135 (recounting testimony of law enforcement expert). 
196  Id. at 1125. One component of the plaintiffs’ claims was that officers who used mace on 
high school students failed to decontaminate them appropriately, prolonging the pain and 
burning that flows from the use of mace. Id. at 1151–58. 
197  Id. at 1137. 
198  Id. at 1143 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)) (“Claims alleging that 
an officer used excessive force during the course of an arrest or other ‘seizure’ are analyzed 
under an objective reasonableness standard.”). 
199  Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
200  Id. The court’s entire recitation of the standard is as follows: 
If “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the [plaintiffs’] Fourth Amendment interests” out-
weigh “the countervailing government interests at stake,” the seizures violated the plaintiffs’ 
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Eleventh Circuit case involving the use of mace, which articulated a bright-line 
rule about when the use of mace is justified: “ ‘Courts have consistently con-
cluded that using pepper spray is reasonable . . .  where the plaintiff was either 
resisting arrest or refusing police requests, such as requests to enter a patrol car 
or go to the hospital.’ ”201 It further described the Eleventh Circuit’s standards 
for the use of mace, noting that “in situations where the suspect faces only mi-
nor charges, does not pose a risk to anyone’s safety, and is not resisting arrest 
or attempting to flee, an officer’s use of chemical spray is generally exces-
sive.”202 
The “final consideration” the court identified as relevant to the Fourth 
Amendment analysis was that “the defendant S.R.O.s inflicted the alleged ex-
cessive force at issue here on students in schools.”203 Noting that “courts have 
routinely determined that under certain circumstances, public school students 
enjoy reduced rights pursuant to the First and Fourth Amendments,”204 the 
court next recited the T.L.O. standard for the constitutionality of searches in 
schools settings,205 and noted that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has extended this rule 
to seizures by school-based police officers.”206  
Ultimately, the court described the question of whether T.L.O. or Graham 
applied as “largely academic” because it would reach the same result on the 
plaintiffs’ claims whether it utilized “T.L.O.’s reasonable-under-the-
                                                                                                                                 
constitutional rights. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 
(1985)). 
In the Eleventh Circuit, courts determine whether the “nature and quality of the intrusion” on 
Fourth Amendment interests surpasses the government interests at stake by considering “1) the 
need for the application of force, 2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force 
used, and 3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (citing Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986)). To evaluate the need 
for the application of force, courts follow the factors laid out in Graham—“the severity of the 
crime, the danger to the officer, and the risk of flight.” Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1198. The guiding 
principle in excessive force cases is that “ ‘gratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is not 
resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.’ ” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 738 
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1330). 
J.W., 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1143. 
201  Id. at 1144 (quoting Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348). 
202  Id. at 1144–45 (citing Hawkins v. Carmean, 562 F. Appx. 740, 743 (11th Cir. 2014); Fils 
v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2011); Brown, 608 F.3d at 739–40; 
Howell v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 349 F. Appx. 399, 405 (11th Cir. 2009); Reese v. 
Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)). 
203  Id. at 1145. 
204  Id. (emphasis added) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007); Vernonia 
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–66 (1995); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). 
205  Id. (“ ‘[A] search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reason-
ably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age 
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.’ ” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342)). 
206  Id. (citing Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
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circumstances test,” or Graham’s.207 As a result, the court did not clearly iden-
tify the applicable Fourth Amendment standard. 
With respect to the specific incidents at issue, the court concluded that two 
of the eight plaintiffs had been subjected to excessive force when SROs 
sprayed them with mace.208 Both students were restrained at the time the mace 
was used—one in handcuffs,209 the other pinned against a set of lockers by two 
adult men210—and were being minimally disruptive, one simply crying hysteri-
cally.211 Both were charged with only minor offenses, and both experienced “a 
great deal of physical pain.”212  
The court deemed the use of mace “reasonable” and compliant with Fourth 
Amendment standards against the remaining six plaintiffs. One student had 
been fighting with a classmate, and pulled away from “someone [who] grabbed 
her from behind.”213 Although she was not aware that the person grabbing her 
was a police officer, the “resistance” she offered made the use of mace reason-
able.214 Another student had fought with a classmate in a cafeteria and grabbed 
the classmate’s hair.215 The use of mace was reasonable because the police of-
ficers on the scene could not manage to break up the fight before they used the 
mace.216 And, in express reliance on a prior Eleventh Circuit case,217 the district 
court concluded that a police officer acted reasonably when he maced a third 
plaintiff—a seventeen-year-old girl “who was 5’4” and weighed only 110 
pounds”218—because she “pull[ed] away” from a police officer, “who was 6’1” 
and weighed 240 pounds,” and “actively attempted to charge at [the school 
principal] who . . . was out of harm’s way.”219 Yet another student, whose in-
teraction with police officers stemmed from allegations that she was smoking 
in the bathroom, “swung her book bag at [the police officer], hitting him with 
it, and ran out of the front door.”220 After the officer tackled her and she fell in-
to shrubbery, she was maced as she “was lying face down on the ground with 
[the officer] on top of her,” and “resisted [the officer]’s attempts to handcuff 
her.”221 Because of “[the Eleventh C]ircuit’s general principal [sic] that fleeing 
                                                        
207  Id. at 1147. 
208  Id. at 1147–48. 
209  Id. at 1147. 
210  Id. 
211  Id. at 1131, 1147. 
212  Id. at 1147–48. 
213  Id. at 1127. 
214  Id. at 1148. This conclusion was the law of the case following an earlier appeal. Id. 
215  Id. at 1128–29, 1149. 
216  Id. at 1149. 
217  Id. at 1148 (citing Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 739 (11th Cir. 2010)). 
218  Id. 
219  Id. 
220  Id. at 1133–34. 
221  Id. at 1134. 
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from law enforcement justifies the use of chemical spray,” the court concluded 
that the use of mace was not excessive force.222 
Because the plaintiffs sought to hold the municipality liable for the consti-
tutional violations, the court considered evidence of the Birmingham Police 
Department’s systemic mace practices in the city’s high schools.223 A review of 
110 use of force reports concerning the use of mace over eight years uncovered 
a “recurring theme”:224 “SROs using Freeze +P to subdue students who, to be 
sure, [we]re loudly misbehaving, but who d[id] not pose an immediate threat of 
physical harm to other students and school staff, the officers, or themselves.”225 
At least eleven students were maced “solely for verbal noncompliance.”226 With 
the extensive trial record in mind, the J.W. court found injunctive relief was 
necessary to remedy the ongoing unconstitutional practices of the Birmingham 
Police Department.227 
This case offers a prime example of a court incorporating Fourth Amend-
ment standards that apply to street-policing practices in the school context in-
volving youth. This approach demonstrates the court’s disregard of the differ-
ent impact that policing practices have on youth rather than adults. Although 
the court seemed mindful of the negative impact that the Birmingham Police 
Department’s frequent use of mace had on students and the school climate gen-
erally, its Fourth Amendment analysis did not reflect that understanding. 
                                                        
222  Id. at 1148–49. In addition, the court concluded that the police department’s failure to 
decontaminate six of the eight plaintiffs after they were maced constituted excessive force. 
Id. at 1126. Notably, “with regard to most of the plaintiffs, the defendants did absolutely 
nothing . . . to ease the plaintiffs’ pain.” Id. at 1156. The court did not separately analyze 
whether handcuffing in some or all of the cases constituted excessive force. 
223  Id. at 1168–72. The Birmingham Police Department appears to have maintained a single 
use of force policy that applied to all officers, whether they were working as S.R.O.s in 
schools or patrolling the streets. It provided Birmingham police officers with broad authority 
to use force, allowing its use, for example, “ ‘to stop potentially dangerous and unlawful be-
havior . . . and in the process of effecting lawful arrest or detention when the subject offers 
resistance.’ ” Id. at 1135. Assigning levels to both resistance and types of force, it allowed a 
two-level disparity between resistance and force, which in practice meant that “chemical 
spray, a Level 4 use of force, [wa]s a permissible response to verbal noncompliance, which 
is Level 2 resistance.” Id. at 1169. It did not require consideration of factors such as: 
the seriousness of the crime committed by the subject, the subject’s size, age and weight, the ap-
parent physical ability of the subject, the number of subjects present, the weapons possessed or 
available to the subject, whether the subject has a known history of violence, whether innocents 
or potential victims are present in the area, and whether evidence is likely to be destroyed. 
Id. at 1136. 
224  Id. at 1169. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. at 1176. (“[T]he defendant S.R.O.s readily admit that they consider the use of Freeze 
+P as an appropriate response to students who refuse their commands, for example, to stop 
crying, or who simply challenge them by backtalking or cursing at them.”). 
227  Id. at 1178–79. 
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b. The Circuit Courts: Divergent Results 
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have resolved cases using analyses 
similar to that of the Alabama district court in the J.W. case. In three cases, stu-
dents claimed excessive force because law enforcement officers handcuffed 
them.228 In another, the plaintiff alleged that the use of a “twist-lock”—“a ‘con-
trol hold’ in which the officer twists the suspect’s hand to place ‘tension on the 
arm to get [him] to comply’ ”229—violated his Fourth Amendment rights.230 In 
all of them, the courts relied primarily on Graham v. Connor to identify the ap-
propriate standard. 
The Sixth and Tenth Circuit cases all involved examples of typical misbe-
havior for seventh and fifth graders, respectively: a seventh grader who ran out 
of the principal’s office when questioned about detentions for fighting;231 a fifth 
grader who took an iPad from school (and attempted to return it);232 and a sev-
enth grader who “generated several fake burps” that “allegedly disrupt[ed] his 
                                                        
228  See A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016); C.B. v. City of So-
nora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Neague ex rel. Neague v. Cynkar, 258 
F.3d 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2001). 
229  Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 591 F. Appx. 669, 670 (10th Cir. 2014) (alteration in origi-
nal). The court also noted that: 
[its] case law describes the twist-lock as a technique in which an officer grabs a suspect’s hand 
and twists to tighten up the arm. The maneuver allows the officer to twist the arm further if the 
suspect begins to fight or otherwise resist. The idea is to painfully, but without intentional injury, 
distract the suspect from what he is doing (fighting or resisting). 
Id. at 670 n.1. 
230  Id. at 673. 
231  Neague, 258 F.3d at 505–06. A more detailed description of the incident is as follows: 
The plaintiff, a seventh grader who was called to the principal’s office because he had been 
involved in two fights and ordered to attend detention on three Saturdays. Id. at 505. Upon 
questioning about a letter from the plaintiff’s mother objecting to the detentions, the plaintiff 
cursed at the principal and used other profane language, “knocked [a] tape recorder out of 
[the principal’s] hands, ducked under the principal’s arm, and ran out of the office.” Id. at 
506. The principal responded by having his secretary call the police. Id. Upon arrival, the 
responding officers approached the plaintiff in the cafeteria, and ultimately returned him to 
the principal’s office. Id. Once there, the police sergeant handcuffed him at the principal’s 
request. Id. 
232  Hawker, 591 F. App’x at 670. The factual background was described in cogent detail by 
Judge Lucero in his published concurrence: 
A nine-year-old child has admittedly taken an iPad from school. His grandmother, commenda-
bly, sees the iPad at home and admonishes and directs him to return it to his school. So far, so 
good. In the process of returning the iPad, things go awry. The principal sees the child with the 
iPad, and after the child refuses to give it up, a school employee grabs it from his hands. A 
struggle ensues, with the child attempting to hit, kick, and head-butt three school employees, 
who eventually restrain him. When his grandmother is called, the child calms down. A police of-
ficer is also called, and the principal tells the officer she wants theft charges filed. While the 
child’s grandmother looks on, the officer grabs the 67-pound child by the arm and yanks him off 
the floor, and then, after the child grabs the officer’s arm, the officer puts him in a twist-lock, 
slams him against the wall, and handcuffs him. 
Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1243 (10th Cir. 2014) (Lucero, J., concurring). 
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physical-education class.”233 Yet both courts invoked Graham v. Connor and 
other cases involving adult arrests as setting the standards for excessive force 
cases involving juveniles in school, and neither court cited T.L.O. in its anal-
yses.234 
The Sixth Circuit determined that the case before it turned on whether the 
force was “objectively reasonable.”235 It also “ma[de] explicit” what was im-
plied in another case: “[W]hen there is no allegation of physical injury, the 
handcuffing of an individual incident to a lawful arrest is insufficient as a mat-
ter of law to state a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.”236 
That is, the Sixth Circuit decided that all claims of excessive force under the 
Fourth Amendment require a showing of physical injury. 
The Tenth Circuit case involving the use of a twist-lock, which was un-
published and accompanied by a published concurrence decrying the out-
come,237 also relied heavily on Graham and never cited T.L.O.238 Quoting Gra-
ham, the majority concluded that the appropriate analysis “turn[ed] on whether 
[the officer]’s use of the twist-lock was ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting [her], without regard to [her] underlying 
intent or motivation.”239 That said, it did recognize the student’s age and size—
nine years old and sixty-seven pounds—as relevant factors.240 But “these fac-
tors alone d[id] not render force used against him unreasonable per se.”241 In-
stead, the court reasoned that because the plaintiff “had been physically com-
bative towards the school employees prior to [the officer’s] arrival, requiring 
the efforts of three individuals to restrain him,”242 and he “grabbed [the of-
ficer]’s arm, an action a reasonable officer could objectively view as an act of 
violent resistance,”243 the twist-lock—which resulted in a “possible hairline 
fracture to his left clavicle (collarbone),” as well as “anxiety and post-traumatic 
stress”244—did not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.245  
                                                        
233  A.M., 830 F.3d at 1129. The factual background of this case is described above. See su-
pra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
234  A.M., 830 F.3d at 1151–56; Hawker, 591 F. App’x at 674–75 & n.8; Neague, 258 F.3d at 
507–08. 
235  Neague, 258 F.3d at 507 (quoting Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th 
Cir. 1993)). 
236  Id. at 508. 
237  Hawker, 774 F.3d at 1243 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
238  See Hawker, 591 F. App’x at 674–75. 
239  Id. at 674 (alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). 
240  Id. at 675. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Id. at 671. 
245  Id. at 675. Judge Lucero, who would have dissented, “[b]ut for the current state of the 
law,” agreed with this conclusion, but lamented that the jurisprudence “stems from what [he] 
consider[ed] to be an improperly and inadequately developed state of the law for treating 
childhood criminal behavior.” Hawker, 774 F.3d at 1243 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
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The second Tenth Circuit case, A.M. ex rel. F.M. v. Holmes, discussed in 
Section II.C.1,246 involved an arrest and handcuffing for fake burping that al-
legedly interfered with “the educational process” of a public school.247 There, 
the court rested its decision to deny the plaintiff’s claim on the second prong of 
the qualified immunity standard.248 Therefore, the relevant inquiry was whether 
there was “clearly established law indicating that F.M.’s minor status could ne-
gate Officer Acosta’s customary right to place an arrestee in handcuffs during 
the arrest.”249 Answering “no,” the court did not even mention T.L.O., and in-
stead cited cases it read to allow the handcuffing of all arrestees.250 According-
ly, it failed to tie the legal standard in any way to the plaintiff’s status as a thir-
teen-year-old seventh-grader, or the school setting in which the use of force 
took place.251 
Finally, like the district court in J.W., the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
T.L.O. or Graham dictated the standard for analyzing the plaintiff’s excessive 
force claim stemming from his handcuffing and determined that the result 
would be the same regardless of the standard.252 The court did not employ the 
two-step T.L.O. approach. Instead, it simply assessed “reasonableness,” and 
concluded that the handcuffing was not reasonable because the “use of hand-
cuffs on a calm, compliant, but nonresponsive 11-year-old child was unreason-
able under either [the T.L.O. or Graham] standard.”253  
These cases reveal that federal courts have been unwilling to grapple with 
the distinctions between uses of force by law enforcement officers in schools 
and on the streets, as well between juveniles and adults. Although some courts 
have concluded that application of Graham or T.L.O. would yield the same re-
sult, they have expressed strong hesitation to declare that one standard should 
take precedence over the other. They have not, therefore, considered whether 
the Supreme Court’s identification of the unique interests at play in schools 
should play a role in determining the appropriate Fourth Amendment standards. 
They have also ignored the unique vulnerabilities of youth in determining 
whether the use of mace, handcuffs, or other types of physical force against 
students meet constitutional muster.  
                                                        
246  See supra Section II.C.1. 
247  A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2016). 
248  Id. at 1152. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. at 1154–55 (citing, inter alia, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); 
Petersen v. Farnsworth, 371 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004); Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 
F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 2009); Hedgepeth ex rel. Hedgepeth v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 
386 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
251  Id. at 1151–56. 
252  C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As noted above, 
the officers were told that the boy was a “runner” who hadn’t taken his medication when 
they arrived at a schoolyard, where they encountered the boy sitting quietly. Id. at 1034. 
253  Id. at 1030. 
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In sum, courts have applied a variety of standards to claims brought by 
youth alleging that they were victims of unconstitutional seizures or excessive 
force at the hands of law enforcement officers in schools. Some courts have de-
clared the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify a seizure, while oth-
ers have looked more broadly into the reasonableness of the officers’ actions. 
For example, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a case-by-case reasonableness ap-
proach for evaluating seizures,254 the Eleventh Circuit has employed a case-by-
case analysis of whether a seizure was “ ‘justified at its inception’ ”—turning on 
whether the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was present—and “ ‘rea-
sonably related in scope,’ ”255 and the California Supreme Court has held that 
seizures are permissible unless arbitrary and capricious.256 In response to claims 
of excessive force, some courts have ignored T.L.O. entirely, while others have 
mentioned it, but focused on the Graham standard.257 Most have not interpreted 
T.L.O. or the Supreme Court’s other cases considering the scope of students’ 
constitutional rights in schools to require an adjustment to the usual stand-
ards—except the occasional observation that students have reduced Fourth 
Amendment rights in schools. 
As noted in Part I, these cases reveal two common and erroneous assump-
tions in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence concerning seizures and uses of force 
in schools. First, courts assume that law enforcement tactics have a positive, or 
at least benign, impact on schools and students. Second, based on the assump-
tion that Fourth Amendment rules should be uniform and that the interests and 
vulnerabilities of adults and youth are the same, courts have imported rules and 
standards (ancillary to the Fourth Amendment’s core demand of reasonable-
ness) developed in cases involving adults to those involving youth in schools—
especially with regard to uses of force.258 Both assumptions demonstrate a fail-
ure to consider whether the rationales for those rules and standards appropriate-
ly account for the unique interests at stake in cases involving schools and 
youth. 
These errors reflect a puzzling paradox of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence involving seizures and uses of force in schools: a simultaneous recogni-
tion (by most courts) that school policing is different from street-policing, but a 
refusal to alter the standards applied to better fit the different environment. This 
paradox should not stand. Instead, courts should put aside the standards that 
govern street-policing when adjudicating cases involving seizures and uses of 
force in schools and recalibrate their definition of “reasonableness” to account 
                                                        
254  Id. 
255  Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). 
256  In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 246 (Cal. 2001). 
257  See, e.g., J.W. v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1143 (N.D. Ala. 
2015). 
258  Examples of such rules include such as a requirement of physical injury, or an effective 
safe harbor for handcuffing an arrestee when probable cause of some crime exists, regardless 
of age or context. See supra notes 177–80, 235–36 and accompanying text. 
18 NEV. L.J. 863, KARTERON  - FINAL 5/31/18  11:12 AM 
Spring 2018] ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT 905 
appropriately for the relevance of the school setting and the unique vulnerabil-
ity of juveniles to be harmed as a result of seizures and uses of force. I offer 
such an approach that accounts for these salient characteristics in Part III.  
III. RECALIBRATING REASONABLENESS TO ASSESS SEIZURES AND USES OF 
FORCE IN SCHOOLS 
This Article proposes that courts rethink their approach to analyzing sei-
zures and uses of force of youth in schools. It provides a definition of reasona-
bleness that is rooted in Supreme Court precedent, accounts for the needs of 
schools and students, and is readily administrable. This approach addresses the 
chief flaws of the jurisprudence in this area by recognizing both the longstand-
ing recognition that the school context is unique and that youth are especially 
vulnerable to the harmful effects of seizures and uses of force.  
This section proceeds in two parts. Section A expounds on the core princi-
ples announced by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. and Vernonia that should in-
fluence how the Fourth Amendment applies in the school setting. In addition, 
this Article suggests that the “age matters” principle articulated by the Supreme 
Court in other criminal procedure contexts should be used to answer Fourth 
Amendment questions as well. Section B sets forth an amended reasonableness 
framework for evaluating seizures and uses of force in schools under the Fourth 
Amendment. Specifically, it proposes that seizures and uses of force should be 
judged under a standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances that re-
quires consideration of several enumerated criteria that are necessary for defin-
ing reasonableness regarding the treatment of youth in schools. This approach 
is faithful to precedent and cabins the devolution of “reasonableness” into a 
meaningless morass that is effectively no standard at all. 
A. T.L.O. Takeaways 
T.L.O. directly addressed only searches but announced two principles, am-
plified in later cases, which are useful in identifying the appropriate standard 
for judging seizures and uses of force in schools under the Fourth Amendment. 
First, given that adjustment of the usual Fourth Amendment standards is neces-
sary because school is a unique environment, determining “reasonableness un-
der all the circumstances” requires balancing an individual’s interests with gov-
ernmental interests and recognizing that the infringement of the student’s 
interests should be limited to that which is necessary to accommodate the gov-
ernment’s interest. Second, age is relevant to determining reasonableness when 
evaluating Fourth Amendment issues involving children in schools. 
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1. The School Context Shapes the Meaning of Reasonableness 
In T.L.O., the Court discussed the unique need to maintain order in schools 
as the key to defining reasonableness in the school context.259 Given that need, 
the Court held that the school context required deviation from the usual warrant 
requirement for searches.260 As noted in Section II.A, the Court further ex-
pounded on its “school is different” thesis in Vernonia, when it considered the 
constitutionality of a drug-testing program for student-athletes, more clearly 
stating that “the nature of [constitutional] rights is what is appropriate for chil-
dren in school.”261 It held as follows: “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than 
elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial 
and tutelary responsibility for children.”262 
However, the Court has never announced that the uniqueness of the school 
environment means that categorically lower constitutional protections apply. 
Although it has approved searches that would not usually pass constitutional 
muster largely because they took place in schools, it has never indicated that 
such approval would always be forthcoming. Instead, consideration of the 
unique interests at play in schools is essential to defining reasonableness and 
should sometimes lead to greater protection for students against seizures and 
uses of force than would typically exist.  
Thus, determining “reasonableness under all the circumstances” requires 
both balancing an individual’s interests with governmental interests and recog-
nition that when “schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children”263 
is at play, the government’s power must be limited so that it fits educational in-
terests.264 Identifying the specific interests of both the individual and school in 
defining educational interests is particularly important.  
                                                        
259  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338–39 (1985). 
260  Id. at 340 (“It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to 
which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in par-
ticular, is unsuited to the school environment[.]”); see also id. (“The school setting also re-
quires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a 
search.”). 
261  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). 
262  Id. 
263  Id. 
264  Kathryn Urbonya has made a similar argument in the context of exploring the Fourth 
Amendment standards that should apply specifically to school officials who use force against 
students. She explained: 
The unique context of the public schools, in which officials exercise neither criminal law en-
forcement powers nor parental powers but rather “custodial” and “tutelary” powers, thus com-
plicates the Fourth Amendment analysis of reasonableness. The reasonableness of physical force 
becomes intertwined with the school’s power to exercise limited custody and requires an “objec-
tive” examination of whether the force used was reasonable under the particularized circum-
stances confronting a given school official and whether it furthered the purpose for which it was 
used. 
Urbonya, supra note 193, at 424–25 (footnotes omitted). 
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In T.L.O. and subsequent cases, all decided in the context of a search con-
ducted by a school official, the Court identified privacy as the only student in-
terest at stake.265 And the Court has identified the school’s interest in maintain-
ing an orderly environment where rules are followed as the countervailing 
interest.266 But, when seizures and uses of force are at issue, other interests are 
at stake. 
Beginning with the student’s interests, it is critical not to conflate the inter-
ests implicated by searches, seizures, and uses of force. Searches primarily im-
plicate privacy and dignitary interests; seizures affect a person’s dignity, as 
well as autonomy, bodily integrity, and “locomotion.”267 The interests implicat-
ed by uses of force bear a much stronger resemblance to those implicated by 
seizures, and are effectively derivative of them, but some are implicated to a 
stronger degree. For example, a use of force that results in pain or physical in-
jury more directly implicates a student’s interest in bodily integrity than a sei-
zure accomplished with little or no force, such as confining a student to a 
room.268 
Courts rarely take note of these different interests in Fourth Amendment 
analyses concerning seizures or uses of force, and scholars have paid scant at-
tention to doctrine concerning seizures as well.269 As recounted in Section II.C, 
numerous courts have followed this unfortunate course when deciding cases 
stemming from encounters in schools. But T.L.O., its progeny, and logic all 
suggest that courts addressing Fourth Amendment questions in schools should 
not ignore these differences. Instead, courts should recalibrate reasonableness 
to fit the context and subjects (students) in play. 
A standard that also accurately reflects the government’s interests in effect-
ing seizures and uses of force in schools is necessary. As noted above, in T.L.O. 
                                                        
265  See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654 (“The first factor to be considered is the nature of the 
privacy interest upon which the search here at issue intrudes.”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 338–40 (1985). 
266  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (“How, then, should we strike the balance between the school-
child’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to main-
tain an environment in which learning can take place?”); see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 
(characterizing governmental interest as “[d]eterring drug use”). 
267  See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 357–58 (1998); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the 
Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 
1328–30 (1990) Gouldin, supra note 23, at 59. 
268  Moreover, as Alexander Reinert has suggested, collective interests as well as individual 
interests should be recognized in Fourth Amendment analyses. See Alexander A. Reinert, 
Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1478 
(2010). In the school context, this would allow recognition of the harm that befalls the entire 
school community when seizures and uses of force are used. This harm is intensified when it 
occurs in a public setting, e.g., such as a perp-walk down a school hallway. Id. at 1489 (“A 
public Fourth Amendment intrusion leaves an impression, especially one that is perceived as 
wrongful or unjustified.”). 
269  As noted above, this lack of attention has led Lauryn Gouldin to label seizure doctrine a 
“neglected sibling.” Gouldin, supra note 23, at 59. 
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and related cases, the Supreme Court appears to define the government’s key 
interest as, above all, order maintenance. It has posited that maintaining order is 
necessary “to maintain an environment in which learning can take place[.]”270 
But seizures and uses of force are not always necessary to achieve order. In-
deed, their use can be detrimental to that goal. In concluding otherwise, the 
Court has been engaged in “blind balancing,” that is, “the process of decision 
making based simply on common sense and a gut assessment of risk, without 
consideration of data, evidence, or empirical studies.”271 To avoid this pitfall, 
courts should be attentive to evidence of how seizures and uses of force actual-
ly relate to government interests. 
Seizures and uses of force in schools should not be viewed as necessarily 
having a beneficial effect on the school environment. As recounted in Section 
I.A, several studies have revealed that a law enforcement presence in schools 
typically leads to the criminalization of normal adolescent behavior, which im-
pacts the climate of the entire school.272 Moreover, students can be injured not 
just when they themselves are at risk of physical violence at the hands of law 
enforcement, but when their classmates are as well. For example, as the trial in 
the J.W. case in Birmingham revealed, uses of force in schools can directly im-
pact unintended targets, like mace temporarily debilitating students or teachers 
who happen to be in the area.273 And the forceful removal of a student from a 
classroom can be traumatizing for student-witnesses, like in Columbia, South 
Carolina.274 Given that social science literature reveals that a school’s entire 
environment can be rendered toxic by the use of aggressive security measures 
such as metal detectors, we should expect sometimes violent seizures and uses 
of force to do so as well.275 
For these reasons, the two-step analysis the Court used in T.L.O. to define 
“reasonableness, under all the circumstances” when considering a search—
“ ‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’ ”276 and “whether the 
search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place’ ”277—is not well-
suited to analyze seizures and uses of force in schools. It does not account for 
the unique interests at play when seizures and uses of force are at issue, making 
replacement of the word “search” with “seizure”278 inadequate. 
                                                        
270  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
271  Baradaran, supra note 28, at 3. 
272  See supra Section I.A. 
273  J.W. v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 143 F. Supp. 3d 1118, 1128–29 (N.D. Ala. 2015). 
274  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
275  See supra notes 46–71 and accompanying text. 
276  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 
(1968)). 
277  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). 
278  See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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In particular, the variation in types of seizures and uses of force makes 
T.L.O.’s two-step analysis a particularly poor fit. As cases described in Part II 
make clear, seizures take many forms—from confining a student to an office 
for a short period of time, to handcuffing in a school hallway. Additionally, 
such seizures often escalate to involve the use of force. When a school resource 
officer confronts a student in the hallway, tells her to stop, the student stops, 
and the officer then maces her because she is too loud for the officer’s taste, 
how does one define the “inception” of the action? Does the seizure—
accomplished by the student’s compliance with the order to stop—mark the in-
ception of the action? Or the deployment of mace? In contrast, it is typically 
much easier to identify the inception of a search. 
Similarly, determining whether a seizure “as actually conducted was rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place,” would often be no easy task. This is because the circumstances 
that may justify seizures in the first place do not account for the escalation that, 
unfortunately, often takes place. That is, it may well be the course of conduct 
that unfolds after the seizure that determines whether the use of force is appro-
priate. To take the prior example, the justification for an initial seizure may 
have little or no bearing on whether the subsequent use of force, like a twist-
lock or a Taser—with its attendant pain and trauma—is justified. In the other 
direction, if a seized student fails to comply with further instructions and takes 
actions that disrupt school proceedings and create danger to herself or others, 
force may become appropriate. 
2. Age Matters in Determining Reasonableness 
Another key principle identified in T.L.O.—that age is relevant to deter-
mining whether a law enforcement action has met the Fourth Amendment’s 
demand for reasonableness—offers further insight into how seizures and uses 
of force in schools should be judged. As previously noted, T.L.O. itself did not 
specify why that factor mattered or how it should factor into the analysis.279 The 
Court’s decisions in other constitutional contexts, which recognize that the sig-
nificant differences between juveniles and adults require alternative standards 
for the two, provide some direction.  
In a series of cases concerning the sentencing of juvenile offenders, the 
Court has categorically decided that the Eighth Amendment bars the death pen-
alty and sentencing schemes that mandate life without the opportunity for pa-
role for juveniles found guilty of both homicides and non-homicides.280 Central 
to the Court’s analyses in those cases was that juvenile offenders are less cul-
                                                        
279  See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
280  Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (“We . . . hold that the Eighth Amendment 
forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for ju-
venile offenders.”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 568 (2005) (“A majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on 
juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment.”). 
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pable than adults because of their “lack of maturity and an undeveloped sense 
of responsibility,”281 “often result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered actions 
and decisions.”282 It also observed that juveniles “ ‘are more vulnerable or sus-
ceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure’; 
and their characters are ‘not as well formed,’ ”283 and that “parts of the brain in-
volved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.”284 Cit-
ing its longstanding precedent that “a sentencer ha[s] the ability to consider the 
‘mitigating qualities of youth,’ ”285 it reiterated that “ ‘youth is more than a 
chronological fact.’ ”286 Distinct from adulthood, “[i]t is a time of immaturity, 
irresponsibility, ‘impetuousness[,] and recklessness.’ ”287 In consideration of all 
of these characteristics, it concluded that juveniles are “less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.”288 
Similarly, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court focused on 
whether a juvenile criminal defendant’s age could be considered in an analysis 
of whether the juvenile was “in custody” at the time of police questioning.289 
This objective inquiry has two parts: “first, what were the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a 
reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to terminate the interroga-
tion and leave.”290 Noting that “ ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial 
recognition’ that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults,”291 it 
concluded that consideration of a juvenile’s age could be considered “so long 
as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of the police questioning, 
or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.”292 
In short, the Court has been clear that “age matters.”293 Numerous scholars 
have interpreted the Court’s analyses in these cases to signal “the dawning of a 
new constitutional principle: ‘Juveniles are different.’ ”294 This concept has 
                                                        
281  Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
282  Id. 
283  Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70). 
284  Id. 
285  Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993)). 
286  Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). 
287  Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368). 
288  Graham, 560 U.S. at 68. 
289  J.D.B v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–72 (2011). 
290  Id. at 270 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). 
291  Id. at 274 (alteration in original) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 
(1982)). 
292  Id. at 277. 
293  Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline Reform: Incorporating the Su-
preme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 933, 935 (2013). 
294  Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile’s Right to Age-Appropriate Sen-
tencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 458, 463 (2012) (internal quotation marks and ci-
tation omitted) (arguing that “juveniles have a substantive constitutional right to be sen-
tenced as juveniles and that mandatory sentencing schemes designed for adults may not be 
automatically imposed on juveniles without courts first conducting a sentencing hearing at 
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found a home in numerous doctrines and should play a central role in establish-
ing the meaning of “reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment, particularly 
seizures and uses of force against juveniles in school. 
The unique vulnerabilities of juveniles further support adopting this ap-
proach in the Fourth Amendment context. As detailed in Section I.B, juveniles 
are cognitively, psychosocially, and neurologically different than adults in 
ways that make them prone to act out, without the intention of being disrup-
tive.295 And, although all arrestees and those subject to the use of force experi-
ence physical and mental harm, such harm is likely to be exacerbated among 
K–12 school students, particularly those who have experienced trauma.296 Thus, 
seizures and uses of force, like sentencing and interrogation practices, affect 
youth differently as well. 
Taken together, these principles reveal that T.L.O. and its progeny should 
not be read to categorically demand less Fourth Amendment protection for stu-
dents in school without regard for whether a search or seizure is at issue. The 
Supreme Court has simply never commanded that the analysis of Fourth 
Amendment protection required in the school context should be a one-way 
downward ratchet. That said, the T.L.O. analysis left unanswered questions 
about how Fourth Amendment analyses of seizures and uses of force should be 
analyzed. The proposed standard set forth below attempts to fill in the gap. 
B. Objective Criteria to Identify Unconstitutional Seizures and Uses of Force 
in Schools 
To reflect the Supreme Court’s admonitions that both context and age mat-
ter, courts should expressly consider the following factors in determining 
whether a seizure or use of force effectuated against a student in school passes 
constitutional muster: the seriousness of the alleged infraction or crime; the 
likelihood that the student has committed an infraction or crime; the age of the 
student; the size and stature of the student; the likelihood of inflicting harm or 
trauma, especially in light of known disabilities or vulnerabilities; and the ne-
cessity of the enforcement action. A reasonableness test requiring consideration 
of these factors recognizes both the sensitivity of the school context and the 
unique vulnerabilities of juveniles. These factors also reflect differences be-
tween searches and seizures, thus addressing and remedying a common error 
                                                                                                                                 
which prosecutors must bear the burden of proving that the juvenile deserves the sentence”); 
see also, e.g., Fedders & Langberg, supra note 293, at 948–49 (arguing that the “age mat-
ters” cases “collectively stand for the proposition that the status of being young entitles a 
minor to different treatment from, and heightened protections against, the state in juvenile 
and criminal justice settings”); Forman, supra note 24, at 308–09, 368. (arguing, following 
Graham v. Florida, that the Fourth Amendment standard for searches in schools should ac-
count for the “development interest” of youth such that students’ Fourth Amendment rights 
become “a tool for democratic socialization”). 
295  See supra notes 72–81 and accompanying text. 
296  See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
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courts have made in judging the constitutionality of seizures and uses of 
force.297  
This recalibrated reasonableness standard expressly considers the circum-
stances that are particularly salient in the policing of youth in schools and better 
accounts for right of youth to be free from unreasonable seizures than the rigid 
and formalistic approach the Supreme Court has typically utilized in non-
school cases. With respect to seizures, the usual standards allow seizures for 
any supposed infraction, no matter how trivial.298 This approach has been sub-
jected to substantial criticism,299 but the externalities that flow from this ap-
proach are magnified in the school context and have not previously been ex-
plored in scholarship. Handcuffing students in school is not a minor 
inconvenience. Especially for young children, it is a traumatizing experience.300 
And the negative impacts that adults suffer from arrests—humiliation and phys-
ical pain at the very least—also apply to youth.301  
In addition, the breadth of infractions or offenses that could result in sei-
zures and handcuffing is simply staggering. This is already true for virtually all 
Americans, but the overlay of school disciplinary rules creates an even greater 
range of offenses that regulate student behavior.302 Given the potential harms 
that are unique to youth, mere commission of an infraction—or suspicion of 
one—should not automatically make a seizure permissible. 
It is therefore necessary to account for the severity of the infraction or 
crime at issue and the likelihood that an infraction or crime has occurred when 
                                                        
297  It is worth noting what this proposed standard does not address: race. All available evi-
dence suggests that seizures and uses of force in school fall more heavily on black and Lati-
no students than others. In addition, as noted in Part I, psychological research suggests that 
black children in particular are less likely to be accorded a presumption of innocence than 
their white peers. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. These disparities and dy-
namics are extremely troubling and deserving of further study and attention. Given that the 
Supreme Court rejected the notion that race is relevant to Fourth Amendment analyses of 
seizures more than twenty years ago in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), this 
Article does not attempt to devise a standard that incorporates race. For excellent critiques of 
Whren and the Supreme Court’s treatment of race in Fourth Amendment cases generally, see 
Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002); An-
thony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999); see also Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998). 
298  See generally Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008); Atwater et al. v. City of Lago 
Vista et al., 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
299  See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasona-
bleness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 329, 331 (2002); Wayne 
A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 
419, 420 (2002). 
300  See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
301  See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. 
302  Justice Stevens’s dissent in T.L.O. recognized this dynamic in 1985. See New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 378–82 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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addressing seizures in schools. While this concept has proven controversial,303 
it is one that the Supreme Court embraced in both T.L.O. and Graham.304 Given 
recognition that the seriousness of the infraction (or crime) at issue is relevant 
to the Fourth Amendment analysis, it certainly requires consideration in evalua-
tions of seizures and uses of force against juveniles in school. 
Any episode involving violent behavior can fairly be described as serious, 
but mere rule violations that do not threaten safety should not be described as 
such. For example, fake burping and refusing to put away a cell phone in class 
would, for example, fit into the non-serious category, weighing against effectu-
ating a seizure, particularly through forceful means. Indeed, it is difficult to un-
derstand why a law enforcement response would ever be appropriate with re-
gard to such misbehavior. Typical juvenile misbehavior that is somewhat more 
serious should not weigh heavily in favor of using seizures or uses of force 
even if it could technically be described as a crime. For example, one could 
likely characterize participation in a food fight or hair pulling as assault,305 but 
doing so would ignore the fact that such behavior is entirely normal given ju-
veniles’ social and emotional development.306 It would also ignore the fear and 
distrust that befall an entire school community when spontaneous outbursts re-
sult in overly harsh punishments. 
The same arguments apply to uses of force. Any person who is punched, 
Tasered, or maced suffers; but the risk of traumatizing youth by using such tac-
tics is especially great.307 The question of age, stature or size, the likelihood of 
inflicting harm or trauma, and known disabilities or vulnerabilities are particu-
larly important in considering uses of force. Handcuffs are less likely to be nec-
essary to restrain a six-year-old than a sixteen-year-old, who, if engaging in be-
havior that disrupts a class or school, can likely be restrained in less restrictive 
ways. Similarly, when an SRO breaks up a fight between two skinny fourteen-
year-old girls, there are certainly more reasonable ways to end the fight besides 
using a Taser or mace. 
                                                        
303  See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reas-
sessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26–34 (2011) (arguing 
that courts should employ a three-tier hierarchy of crimes, “grave,” “serious,” and “minor,” 
and use a reasonable person test to determine crime severity); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simp-
son, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 
843–44 (2001) (arguing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should account for crime se-
verity); Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1957, 1967–70 (2004) (suggesting that options for making crime-severity distinctions in-
clude evaluating a crime’s objective characteristics). 
304  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (holding that “severity of the crime” is one 
factor relevant to determining whether the use of force effected is objectively reasonable); 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. .at 342, 342 n.9 (holding that reasonableness of a search would be deter-
mined in part, by considering “the nature of the infraction”). 
305  Some law enforcement agencies have done so. See Gates, supra note 30; Saulny, supra 
note 30. 
306  See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
307  See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
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The necessity of intervention is also an important consideration that courts 
have typically shied away from examining. Phrased differently, a court should 
consider whether the seizure or use of force at issue was the least restrictive al-
ternative available to address the situation. An inquiry into the purpose of the 
enforcement action and the seriousness of the crime or infraction may address 
these questions. For example, uses of force undertaken for purely punitive pur-
poses could not possibly be thought to be necessary to further any governmen-
tal interest. 
It is also noteworthy that the proposed standard accounts for the substantial 
variety in the roles that law enforcement officers play in schools. As explained 
in Part I, some police officers and sheriff’s deputies regularly patrol school 
hallways, while others respond only when called from either within or outside 
of the school.308 Some school security staff are employed by school districts 
and have no formal connection to any law enforcement agency, while others 
are agents of police departments who receive less pay and training than their 
police officer counterparts. This proposed standard provides flexibility for 
courts confronting law enforcement actors who technically hold a variety of 
roles. These distinctions should not make a difference in assessing the constitu-
tionality of a seizure or use of force. The harm that befalls a student who is 
handcuffed or punched (and that student’s classmates) does not differ because 
of the job title of the government agent who secured the handcuffs or delivered 
the punch. That job title should not, therefore, be determinative of the propriety 
of a seizure or use of force.309 
This approach accords with the principles identified in T.L.O. and the other 
case law identified above and provides sufficient flexibility to account for the 
evolving understanding of schools’ “ ‘tutelary’ as well as ‘custodial’ ” roles 
identified by the Supreme Court in Vernonia.310 As educators and scholars con-
tinue to learn more about the impact of different disciplinary and school securi-
ty practices on school climate and students, it allows courts the flexibility to ac-
                                                        
308  Some police or school security officers are stationed at a post within a school, perhaps at 
an entrance, and generally remain at their post unless called to respond to an incident. Others 
respond to schools following 911 or similar calls. See supra notes 40–43, 58–59 and accom-
panying text. 
309  This standard also eliminates confusion regarding the role of school staff in determining 
the reasonableness of an enforcement action. Some law enforcement officers reportedly be-
lieve that the presence of school personnel creates a safe harbor from Fourth Amendment 
liability. For example, the New York Times recently reported that a Georgia sheriff’s de-
partment conducted invasive searches, in some case strip searches, of hundreds of high 
school students. See Jacey Fortin, “How Far Can They Go?” Police Search of Hundreds of 
Students Stokes Lawsuit and Constitutional Questions, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/us/georgia-police-patdown-students.html 
[https://perma.cc/MVQ8-68AZ]. When asked why he thought the searches were permissible, 
the sheriff replied that the searches passed muster because school administrators were pre-
sent. Although that case involved a search rather than a seizure, it reflects confusion regard-
ing the significance of a school staff member’s presence. 
310  See Urbonya, supra note 193, at 416–17. 
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count for changing understandings of what schools’ tutelary and custodial pow-
ers are. That is, a reasonableness standard utilizing the factors identified above 
can account for the findings of social scientists about how the different ways 
that schools carry out their tutelary powers impact students. 
Like all reasonableness standards, this proposal is subject to criticism. Rea-
sonableness standards in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence have been seriously 
questioned for decades.311 With particular regard to its application to the use of 
force, “reasonableness” has been aptly characterized as an empty vessel into 
which a judge’s predilections and biases can easily fit.312 To some extent, these 
critiques apply to any standard involving reasonableness, including the one 
suggested here.  
The proposed standard also leaves some questions unanswered. For exam-
ple, when multiple factors point in different directions, how should a court de-
termine whether the Fourth Amendment is violated? The answer remains the 
same as it has for generations of courts grappling with the application of rea-
sonableness standards: by considering the totality of the circumstances. It is the 
proposed standard’s non-formulaic nature that makes its application somewhat 
unpredictable, but flexible enough to allow for the myriad circumstances that 
may give rise to Fourth Amendment inquiries involving seizures and uses of 
force in schools.313 
                                                        
311  See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 352 (1974); Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of Reasona-
bleness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 978 (2004); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of 
Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1642 (1998); Cynthia Lee, 
Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 
MISS. L.J. 1133, 1135 (2012); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Ac-
curately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1173, 1173 (1988); Baradaran, supra note 28, at 1. 
312  See Harmon, supra note 140, at 1130 (arguing that Graham’s objective reasonableness 
standard “has largely left judges and juries to their intuitions” in deciding use of force cases). 
313 It is also worth noting that the proposed standard does not address the major hurdle that 
all civil rights plaintiffs face: qualified immunity. Under that doctrine, even when a constitu-
tional violation has occurred, a plaintiff establishes the liability of an individual officer only 
when the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. See City & Cty. 
of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015). Because meeting that standard 
depends on the specificity with which the right is defined, officers are often able to avoid 
liability in Fourth Amendment cases. See Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A 
Provisional Model of Some of the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519–22 (2016). But quali-
fied immunity is not available to municipalities, making recovery possible when a plaintiff 
alleges that the constitutional harm it has suffered was due to a municipal policy. See Owen 
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Courts also have the option of determin-
ing whether a constitutional violation has occurred before determining whether the right at 
issue was clearly established. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233 (2009); Karen M. 
Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 913, 926–40 (2015) (noting that courts often first determine whether the right was 
clearly established). Accordingly, qualified immunity will not necessarily be a bar to liability 
under the proposed standard. 
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But the considerations required by the proposed standard also answer one 
of the chief critiques of reasonableness tests: it rejects a false equivalence be-
tween the interests of individuals subjected to seizure or use of force on one 
hand, and the government’s interests on the other. Instead, it recognizes that the 
government has an interest not only in order in schools, but also the establish-
ment of a school climate that facilitates education for all students—even ones 
who have misbehaved. It also has the substantial benefit of accounting for the 
exceptional context of the school environment and the vulnerable population 
law enforcement officers encounter there, thereby offering appropriate protec-
tion for the weighty constitutional interests at stake. 
When some of the cases identified in Section II.C are reconsidered in con-
formance with this approach the results are more faithful to the principles an-
nounced in T.L.O. For example, Gray v. Bostic, the case involving the hand-
cuffing of nine-year-old girl following her verbal threat to “ ‘do something’ 
physically” to her gym teacher,314 would not result in a reasonable seizure un-
der the proposed standard. The alleged infraction was not serious and, given 
that the teacher subjected to the “threat” continued teaching his class and an-
other teacher present at the scene said she would handle the situation,315 the 
sheriff deputy’s initial detention of the student was plainly unnecessary. The 
handcuffing that followed exacerbated the Fourth Amendment harm. Although 
the student posed no threat to the deputy, any other student or staff member, or 
orderliness in general, the deputy handcuffed the sixty-seven-pound girl to 
show her “how it feels to be in jail” and to “help persuade her to rid herself of 
her disrespectful attitude.”316 The deputy’s purely punitive purpose underscores 
the conclusion that this law enforcement intervention was completely unwar-
ranted, especially given the humiliation and pain likely suffered by the nine-
year-old who was handcuffed in her school lobby. The result under the pro-
posed standard is effectively the same as what the court reached, but the analy-
sis is more straightforward and easier to apply. The Eleventh Circuit held that 
the deputy could not be faulted for temporarily detaining the student while he 
investigated a “verbal threat,” but that the handcuffing violated the Fourth 
Amendment because it exceeded the “scope of the circumstances” that led the 
seizure in the first instance. Application of the proposed standard instead ac-
counts for the needlessness of the entire interaction, the punitive purpose of the 
detention, and the harm visited upon the student subject to the handcuffing, as 
well as the harm felt by other students who witnessed and were likely fright-
ened by it.  
Similarly, application of the proposed standard to the Birmingham mace 
case would also have a more sensible result. There, the court effectively found 
that the Birmingham Police Department violated the Fourth Amendment only 
                                                        
314  Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006). 
315  Id. 
316  Id. 
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when it used mace on students who were speaking or crying while standing 
still. If a student moved at all, she was deemed to have “resisted,” and the use 
of mace was “reasonable,” no matter the student’s age or size. Given the in-
tense physical pain that the use of mace creates, this is not a just, fair, or rea-
sonable result. Application of the proposed standard would recognize as much. 
In identifying specific objective factors relevant to determining reasona-
bleness of seizures or uses of force in school, this Article advances an analyti-
cal standard that is, theoretically, both sound and workable. This approach has 
the benefit of bringing order to the doctrine, where there has been virtually 
none, and provides courts with sufficient flexibility to address cases arising 
from myriad circumstances, while limiting the room for judicial biases and pre-
dilections about notions of orderly schools to determine outcomes.  
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment standard for addressing seizures and uses of force 
in schools offers an important lens through which the school-to-prison pipeline 
can and should be analyzed. This area has been neglected by both courts and 
scholars, and, in the absence of specific guidance from the Supreme Court, 
lower courts appear to feel duty-bound to hew closely to rules announced in 
completely different contexts when confronted with these cases. To date, the 
jurisprudence in this area provides little direction to school districts and law en-
forcement agencies nationwide about the limits of police authority in schools 
and often rests on faulty assumptions about the role of law enforcement tactics 
in schools.  
This Article attempts to correct these deficiencies by offering a recalibrated 
reasonableness standard accounting for the Supreme Court’s central lessons in 
T.L.O. that both the school environment and age matter. It also addresses the 
specific factors relevant to determining the propriety of seizures and uses of 
force—ranging from handcuffing, bear hugs, and seclusion to twist-locks, 
Tasers, mace, and the other law enforcement tactics that should have, at best, a 
limited presence in schools. By demanding adherence to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s “fundamental command” of reasonableness, this proposed standard 
guarantees fair consideration of individual circumstances, sometimes impeded 
by bright-line rules and, most importantly, ensures substantive judicial review 
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